

THE SOURCES AND APPREHENSION OF VALUES
IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION
A CRITIQUE OF THE VALUE THEORIES OF
RALPH BARTON PERRY,
PITIRIM A. SOROKIN,
AND PAUL TILlich

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PREFACE

The opportunity, provided by the Southern California School of Theology and the guidance committee, to study the contributions which have been made toward understanding the sources and apprehension of values is gratefully acknowledged. The range and variety of the definitions of value, the attributed sources, and the methods of apprehension illustrate the present state of confusion in value theory. To bring order out of chaos has not been the goal of this study. A much more modest effort has been made to accentuate the importance of discovering the sources of values in preparation for such a comprehensive theory.

The members of the guidance committee should not be held responsible for mistakes in judgment and the breadth of this study. They have graciously permitted me freedom to roam the wide open range in order to place each of the three primary theories in historical perspective. Many value theorists have not been treated for several reasons. Either they were comparing and restating prior theories, or making slight modifications which have had little influence on subsequent theories. Some resource materials were not available within the limits of time and distance, while others had to be so compressed they may appear very inadequately treated.

I am indebted to members of the guidance committee for both class room discussions and hours of personal conferences. Without the encouragement of these men, Paul B. Irwin, David D. Eitzen, Donald H. Rhoades, Eric L. Titus, and F. Thomas Trotter, this study could not have been made. Harry Bear of Mississippi

State University has been a constant source of information and constructive criticism. The men and their works which have influenced my thinking are listed in the bibliography.

I am particularly grateful to D. W. Colvard, President of Mississippi State University, and members of the Y.M.C.A. Advisory Board, for granting extended vacation time for this research. Also to Clara Craig, Y.M.C.A. Staff Assistant, for painstaking efforts in editing and typing. The library assistance of Mary McCulloch of the Southern California School of Theology has been invaluable. However, the patience and concern of my wife, Elsie, and our two sons, John, Jr. and Cary Lee, are the primary reasons for the privilege I have of writing these lines.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	iii
INTRODUCTION	1
 Chapter	
I. THE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO VALUE	8
II. PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VALUE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO RALPH BARTON PERRY'S "GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE".	18
A. The Valuing Subject as the Source of Values B. The Object of Interest as the Focus of Values C. The Value-Relation Between Any Interest and Its Object D. The Apprehension of Values	
III. SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VALUE WITH PARTIC- ULAR ATTENTION TO PITIRIM A. SOROKIN'S "INTEGRAL THEORY OF VALUE".. . . .	48
A. The Objective Source of Values B. Culture as the Source of Values C. Socio-Psychological Theories of Value D. The Reconstruction of Human Values	
IV. ONTOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VALUE WITH PAR- TICULAR ATTENTION TO PAUL TILLICH'S "BEING AND LOVE".	71
A. The Transcendental-Ideal Source of Values B. The Immanently Real Source of Values C. Existential Experience as the Source of Values D. Being and Love: The Value Equation	

Page

V. CONCLUSION	104
A. The "Is" and the "Ought-to-Be" within the University	
B. Implications for a Comprehensive Theory of Value	
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	117

INTRODUCTION

Higher education in America is now in the midst of its fourth century, if we date its birth with the founding of Harvard University in 1636. It has weathered many storms during this period and has undergone significant changes in response to its supporters. The new-born centers of learning were usually a group of students at the feet of a teacher. As the institutions grew they attracted sponsoring agencies such as churches, foundations, states and individual benefactors. These supporters usually helped define purposes and establish goals.

When the nation was young, the centers of learning small, and largely under local control, there could be general agreement concerning the scale of values and various emphases of the curriculum. As these centers grew and became self-conscious communities of scholars, the struggle for academic and other freedoms very often resulted in tension. For example, an early assumption was that educational institutions shared in the responsibility for the development of the whole person. This included guidance in decision making at all levels, and training in moral and spiritual values was taken for granted. As more and more emphasis was placed on freedom of thought, expression, science, research, technology, vocational training, and pure intellectual excellence, the ethical and religious concerns were left for other institutions to promote.

Certain educators like Harry D. Gideonse have urged that prime consideration be given today to education in human values at least. "The focal importance

of values is clear,"¹ he wrote, but apparently it is not clear to everyone. The opposite point of view has recently been stated by Admiral Hyman George Rickover:

The business of the school can no longer be with social adjustment, emotional security, entertainment, or even with character. Such matters, if they are teachable, belong to the home, the church, or the family doctor Therefore let it concentrate on the job it alone can do: develop the intellectual equipment of every child to its maximum point.²

The insistence of men like Gideonse that values should be in the center of the educational process, the concern of those like Rickover that too much emphasis is on them already, and special conferences on values point up the fact that their study is a live issue in higher education at present. In California, for instance, the first State Conference on Higher Education, held in May 1962, had as its theme, "Higher Education in California: Its Responsibilities for Values in American Life."³

Educational institutions have been generally expected to play a large role in preserving and transmitting the cultural heritage of its nation. In times of rapid cultural transition, when technological, economic and social revolutions, not to mention hot and cold wars, result in cultural confusion, the role of the universities

¹ Harry D. Gideonse, "The Coming Showdown in the Schools," Saturday Review, XXVIII, No. 5 (February 3, 1945), 8.

² James D. Koerner, "Admiral Rickover: Gadfly," Saturday Review, XLIV, No. 15 (April 15, 1961), 63.

³ California Teachers Association, Working Papers for the First Annual Conference on Higher Education, May 11-12, 1962.

comes up for review. Voices from many quarters seek to determine its function, while concerned educators ponder their purposes, responsibilities, and resources. Whether a primary place will be given to values within higher education and its resources used to promote them very likely will depend upon results from various studies now in progress.

One study which has aroused considerable interest and placed the problem in focus was made in 1956, under the direction of the Hazen Foundation and directed by Philip E. Jacob.⁴ An underlying assumption of the report was that values were important and should influence student opinion and action, especially those exposed to the social studies. To say this study created shock waves upon its release is an understatement. The negative findings reported and briefly summarized were:

The study has not discerned significant changes in student values which can be attributed directly either to the character of the curriculum or to the basic courses in social science the quality of teaching has relatively little effect upon the value-outcomes. . . .

The method of instruction seems to have only a minor influence on students' value judgments.⁵

Criticism of the study ranged from faulty methodology, through inadequate data, to the lack of meaning in the definition of terms. The defensive nature of

⁴ Philip E. Jacob, Changing Values in College (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).

⁵ Ibid., pp. 5-8

many reactions leads once again to the conclusion that many educators take seriously their responsibility for promoting values, and are sensitive about evidence of failure in this task.

Some hope that further research in this area will not be in vain is offered in some of Jacob's more positive findings that "Student values do change to some extent in college," and, "With some students, the change is substantial."⁶

One factor emerging from the furor calls for closer analysis. This is that we are far from a consensus on a definition of "value." The group which helped Jacob plan the above study decided the empirical approach was necessary. This required a clear conception of the value-datum for which they were searching. It was agreed to define "'values' or 'value-patterns' as preferences, criteria or choices of personal or group conduct."⁷ A value would be an identifiable standard used by an individual or group in making decisions. Confirmatory evidence that the standard had influenced the decision would be either "(a) an expressed verbal statement or (b) overt conduct."⁸

When this definition was severely criticized, the Hazen Foundation assigned Professor John E. Smith the task of sifting the suggestions and conferring with other educators about the problem. Smith's report,⁹ while mildly critical of the utilitarian definition in the Jacob study, remained skeptical of the ability of higher education either to define or deal with the more personal and intrinsic values. He did

⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁷ Ibid., p. xiii.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ John E. Smith, Value Convictions and Higher Education (New Haven: The Edward W. Hazen Foundation, 1958).

analyze the three main ways of defining value. It "may mean what is chosen, the fact that something is an object of choice and is preferred, and why it is chosen."¹⁰ The prior study had sought to cover all three ways in the use of "preferences," "choices," and "criteria." However, the evidence cited and the conclusions drawn dealt almost exclusively with the first two, while hardly touching the grounds for criteria. The criteria of evaluation were verbal statements and overt actions in conformity with a standard, but little concern was given to the question of why these actions resulted from the given situation.

Interestingly enough the Smith analysis links preferences and choices with two elements which have been pronounced in American theories of value. Preferences are related to "the strongly subjective bias of recent ethical theory in accordance with which value means whatever is the object of any interest."¹¹ The second element he describes as "the empirical approach to value . . . generally identified with the recording of actual choices."¹² These will be illustrated later, respectively, in the theories of Ralph Barton Perry and Pitirim A. Sorokin. A third element, which seems to have escaped both Jacob and Smith, is of more recent vintage. This is the existential concern for the ultimate source of value expressed through the writings of Paul Tillich. Could this be the missing link, the why, which they allude to, but are unable to cope with through the limitations of psychological analysis and sociological method?

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 17.

¹² Ibid.

Historically the term "value" has been rich in meaning largely because it has not been limited either to a perceiving subject, a visible object, its means of attainment, or a non-attainable ideal. The Jacob study is to be commended for analyzing values within the total context. The question could be raised as to whether their context was too limited. The Subjectivist is satisfied with an interested subject. The Objectivist would extend the context to include the subject, the object, and their interrelationships. Perhaps the Ontologist would remove all limits and take into consideration the very ground of being which sustains all in context and supplies the values.

Further evidence of keen interest is indicated by the formation of a special Committee to Investigate Moral Values in Higher Education. "Aided by a \$500,000,000 grant from three leading foundations,"¹³ this committee, using the Jacob study as the point of departure, plans to study the liberal arts colleges relative to their influence on students' values.

At least one contemporary philosopher, Nels F. S. Ferrè, is convinced "the crisis of our times is the crisis of values."¹⁴ Of primary concern is the source, the nature, and the process of apprehension of values within the university community.

13

J. Burlington Sloe and Lawrence W. Hyman, "Moral Values in Higher Education -- a Preliminary Report," Journal of Higher Education, XXXII (January, 1961), 36.

14

Nels F. S. Ferrè, "Higher Education and Values," Religion in Life, XXIV, No. 4 (Autumn, 1960), 556.

No longer can the true, the good, and the beautiful be taken for granted as the natural choice of students who have been exposed to a body of facts. If man is to survive and keep pace with his intentions, he must have a clearer understanding of the process and motivation for making the best possible decisions in ever shorter periods of time. For this reason the method to be followed in this study is to survey the literature relative to value theory in American higher education, along with certain possible European influences; make a closer examination of three representative theories, with special emphasis on the sources and apprehension of values in them; and draw conclusions suggestive of a comprehensive theory of value, which can be tested in university communities.

CHAPTER 1

THE THEORETICAL APPROACH TO VALUE

Near the end of the nineteenth century the theory of value was a relative newcomer in American philosophy. While it was well under way in Germany, it was considered by certain existential thinkers, like Paul Tillich, as a last ditch effort, a defensive maneuver on the part of the rear guard of German Idealism to preserve human dignity from being submerged by naturalism. It was considered by the Austrian School of Value Theory to be a new discipline which could work with faculty-psychologists in the development of a scientific study of the process of valuation. It was hoped that man could begin to understand his mental and spiritual nature through this method.

On the American scene scholars had been too busy pondering the outside world to give much thought to understanding man's process of making choices. Truth, beauty and goodness were taken for granted, and very few seemed concerned that man differed in their evaluations of alternatives and why. How do we account, then, for the apparently sudden interest in values in America at the beginning of the twentieth century? One answer could be that it was imported from Europe, by certain American educators, as a possible clue to understanding the role of education in the moral development of man. Some looked to the Continent primarily because this problem had been in focus there for some years, and several

schools of thought were exploring value theory in relation to education and scientific analysis of mental processes.

For example, the term "value-judgment," in use by the Herbartian School in Germany was destined to make an impact in both theology and education. The introduction of this term has been traced by Robert Mackintosh,

To a little-known member of the school of Herbart, Ign. Porkorny, 1869. It appears, outside of the Herbartians, in an address of 1871 by a philosophical writer, Rümelin, one of whose volumes Albrecht Ritschl knew and valued. It appears once again within the school of Herbart (Oslawsky; 1873). Next, in the pages of Herrmann's Religion (1878) it begins to seek for recognition from the friends of Ritschl It occurs thrice at least in Schultz's Gotttheit Christi (1881). And it becomes a matter of conscious theory and definition with Kaftan, in the Wesen (also 1881) Finally Ritschl introduces the phrase into edition two of Justification, iii (1883), (and) in the posthumously published Fides Implicita (1890), . . . he recurs to the description of the 'religious judgments of faith' as 'direct value-judgments'.¹⁵

There is always present the danger of losing one's bearings on the sea of semantics, but progress in value theory involves the struggle with words and meanings.

Albrecht Ritschl has greatly influenced some American value theorists, and since his theology at this point was dependent on the philosophical use of the term "value" by Herman Lotze, a look at the context of this terminology is necessary.

Lotze had affirmed:

Genuine Reality in the world . . . consists alone in the Highest-Good But since all the value of what is valuable has existence only in the spirit that enjoys it, therefore all apparent actuality is only a system of contrivances, by means of which this determinate world of phenomena, as well as these determinate metaphysical habitudes for considering the world of phenomena, are called forth, in order that the

¹⁵ Robert Mackintosh, Albrecht Ritschl and His School (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1915), pp. 167-168.

aforesaid Highest-Good may become for the spirit an object of enjoyment in all the multiplicity of forms possible to it.¹⁶

Philosophically this splits the world into "reality" and "appearance," --the world of appearance being only the passing activity of the Highest-Good, which alone is real. The question was raised concerning the place of human beings within this scheme. Lotze conceived of these as relatively independent real beings. He describes them as:

Those of his actions which the Infinite permanently maintains as centres of out-and-in-going effects that are susceptible of acting and being affected; and, indeed, their reality -- that is, the relative independence which belongs to them -- consists, not in a 'Being outside the Infinite' (for such a Being no definition can make clear), but only in this, that they as spiritual elements having Being for self.¹⁷

This paradoxical suspension of man between the natural world of appearance and the Infinite Reality, designating him as a spiritual element with relative independence, has been interpreted by Tillich as Lotze's effort "to save human dignity from the onslaught of a reductionist, materialistic naturalism."¹⁸ At any rate Lotze conceived of man as a valuing subject set apart from the world of nature. Tillich's opposition was apparently shared by many of his fellow students, who he said could not accept "the defeat of metaphysics and the flight into the defences of

¹⁶ Herman Lotze, Outlines of Metaphysics (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1893), pp. 151-152.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁸ Paul Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?" in New Knowledge in Human Values, edited by Abraham H. Maslow (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), p. 189.

the value theory as final. We wanted being."¹⁹ This reaction will be discussed more fully later. At this point the primary concern is to understand the background of Ritschl's thought, whom Tillich has accused of reducing "the assertions of classical theology to value-judgments."²⁰

The theology of Ritschl follows the simple motif that man transcends the world of nature through his spiritual capacity to judge. This is evident especially in his highest concepts which spring from his religious nature, as it were through intuition. His greatest concept, the idea of God, like all others though, "can only be represented in value-judgments."²¹ His line of reasoning is that the mind of man functions in two ways with regard to feelings or sensations. The feelings of pleasure and pain are judged in accord with their value for the ego. The sensations resulting in ideas are judged with respect to their causes and connections with other items of knowledge. These "value-judgments" and "causal-judgments" are related inasmuch as the former evaluate the latter. His theory may be better expressed by the following translated quotation:

Scientific knowledge is accompanied or guided by a judgment affirming the worth of impartial knowledge gained by observation. In Christianity, religious knowledge consists in independent value-judgments, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the blessedness which is assured by God and sought by man, and the whole of the world which God

¹⁹
Ibid., p. 190.

²⁰
Ibid.

²¹
Eugene W. Lyman, "Ritschl's Theory of Value-Judgments," Journal of Religion, V, No. 5 (September, 1925), 503.

has created and rules in harmony with his final end.²²

Values for Lotze and Ritschl are attributes which man affirms about his world, himself and his God. They make their appearance through intuitive imagination even though they may be aroused by sensations and conceived in thought. The vindication of value-judgments lie in their adequacy for presenting a unified world-view, which the causal judgments elicited by scientific observation can never do alone. However, if as Lotze has indicated values exist only within the spirit of man as he enjoys the Highest-Good in its multiplicity of forms, then the door is wide open for relative subjectivism. It is through this door that some value theorists have chosen to walk.

American value theory has been influenced from still another school of thought to some degree. The founder of this Austrian School, Franz Brentano, was born in a castle on the Rhine in 1838, and died in Switzerland in 1917. His "claim to the notice of posterity rests largely on his Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint written in 1874."²³ In this volume he laid the groundwork for his own theory of values as well as that of his students, Alexius von Meinong, Christian von Ehrenfels, Oskar Kraus, and Georg Katkov.

According to a recent study of the work of Brentano, Kraus and Katkov,

²² Ibid., p. 504.

²³ Howard O. Eaton, The Austrian Philosophy of Values (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930), p. 24.

"their effort is marked by a desire to avoid the pitfalls of moral relativism and subjectivism on the one hand, and unwarranted confidence in a preformed ontological value-structure on the other."²⁴ Their approach was psychological and empirical.

Brentano began with the observation, analysis and classification of physical phenomena. His frame of reference being "the various possible types of relationships of a subject to an object."²⁵ This is not to be confused with the objective analysis of the subject-object relationship by a third party. Rather, his whole appeal is to the "inner perception" of the subject which carries on its mental activities through representations, judgments, and attitudes.

His conviction is that these inner actions of the mind are self-evident for the perceiving subject. These faculties of the mind are described as follows:

The simplest possible . . . is when the subject has an 'idea' of the object (Secondly) such an object can be affirmed as true or denied as false and there is still a third elementary way of relationship for the subject to the object, . . . the innumerable attitudes which the subject may take towards the object, to be classed as a whole under the general heading of phenomena of love and hate.²⁶

Brentano is within a hair's breadth of subjectivism in this analysis, as this inner activity is without dependence on any actual external object. He speaks in terms of an "immanent objectivity," without clearly defining what he means. He

²⁴ Harry Bear, "The Theoretical Ethics of the Brentano School, A Psycho-Epistemological Approach" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University, 1954), Abstract.

²⁵ Eton, op. cit., p. 44.

²⁶ Ibid.

nevertheless affirms that

in the representations something is represented, in the judgment something is accepted or rejected, in love something is loved, in hate something is hated, in desire something is desired, etc.²⁷

But what is this something? And furthermore upon what basis can we trust the inner "valuation process" to distinguish clearly these representations, to judge them correctly, and to love or hate appropriately? In other words, it seems that to escape pure subjectivity and relativism it is necessary to have a theory of knowledge and a standard of evaluation more universal in nature. Brentano died before completing his work in which he had promised to deal with the mind-body relationship. In making his appeal to the universal experience of man, as each looked into his own mental processes, he was confident that certain values were right, pleasing, and self-evident.

Alexius von Meinong did not agree with the simple threefold faculty psychology of his teacher. He accepted the concepts of "ideas" and "judgments," but the unitary attitudes he divided into "feelings" and "desires." He is best known for his stress on feeling as the basis of value theory; however, he made a distinct contribution through his theory of knowledge. He noted that we are not only aware of objects, but also of "objectives," which he called objects of a higher order. It was into this latter category he placed values in that they resembled relations more than objects. "In view of this," he stated, "values, like relations, do not exist.

27

Bear, op. cit., p. 6.

They subsist."²⁸ An example of subsistence is the mathematical relationship of a given number to the series of objects which it enumerates.

The third member of the Austrian School, Christian von Ehrenfels, based his theory of value on "desire." He wrote:

We ascribe value to those things which we either actually desire, or would desire in fact if we were not convinced of their existence. The value of a thing is its desirability.²⁹

Desire in this definition is not to be narrowly conceived. It includes wishing, striving, and willing. He differs from both Brentano and Meinong in that desire is not to be classified as a faculty of the mind. In modern language it would be more like the entire "organism" moving toward the object of its desire. His influence has been felt both in the "interest theories" and the empirical listing and classification of types of values. While Meinong was more concerned with what has come to be called "intrinsic" values, Ehrenfels was interested in the "extrinsic" objects which elicited desire.

On the American scene William James published the first edition of The Will To Believe and Other Essays³⁰ in 1897. He did not spell out a theory of values, but noted the limits of the scientific method in stating:

Moral questions immediately present themselves as questions whose solutions cannot wait for sensible proof Science can tell us what exists; but to compare the worths, both of what exists and of what does

²⁸ Eaton, op. cit., p. 232

²⁹ Ibid., p. 183.

³⁰ William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1897).

not exist, we must consult not science, but what Pascal calls our heart.³¹

James expressed concern about the role of the universities in supplying what is today termed "excellence," but which he called "superiority . . . the critical sense, the sense for ideal values."³² Even though a philosopher, expected to hold all things tentative until proven, he refused to hold his will in check when important decisions had to be made before the evidence was all in hand. The will of man in close harmony with his feelings stood ready to exert itself in belief and action.

While James did not specify the sources of values, as such, nor define the term, he accepted the concept of "ideals." He wrote that these "ideals have certainly many sources. They are not all explicable as signifying corporeal pleasures to be gained, and pains to be escaped."³³ In calling attention to the experiencing of values as a philosophical concern, even though beyond the reach of science, he paved the way for future exploration.

Many classifications of value theorists have been made in the history of philosophy. The usual distinctions are pairs of polar opposites such as Absolutists vs. Relativists, Realists vs. Idealists, Naturalists vs. Supernaturalists, and Intuitionists vs. Rationalists. Within each broad classification there are many finer distinctions and possible combinations.

³¹ Ibid., p. 24.

³² William James, Talks to Teachers on Psychology, and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1899), p. 36.

³³ James, The Will to Believe, p. 189.

Since logical analysis requires some type of categorizing, this thesis will follow the three primary sources to which values have been genetically attributed. These are the valuing subject, the social milieu, and being itself. They will be termed the psychological, sociological and ontological theories of value.

The methods of value apprehension cannot be so neatly categorized, as each philosopher may subscribe to innate tendencies, rational reflection, intuition and even revelation. Each method of apprehension will be treated as it arises and summarized in the conclusion.

The sources of value will be treated in historical sequence in as far as possible on the American scene with particular attention to one philosopher in each broad division who has written extensively in the field.

CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VALUE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO RALPH BARTON PERRY'S "GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE"

A. The Valuing Subject as the Source of Value

1. Innate Tendencies and Vital Impulses

Even before the turn of the century George Santayana, a colleague of William James at Harvard, published his theory of esthetics in which he lauded beauty as the "clearest manifestation of perfection, . . . a ground of faith in the supremacy of the good."³⁴ His main contribution to the theory of the sources and apprehension of values came later in five volumes entitled, The Life of Reason.³⁵ He defined reason as the energy pulsing through common sense, society, religion, art and science to bring harmony and integration to man's interests. For him, "the Life of Reason is the happy marriage of two elements -- impulse and ideation."³⁶ Values, he explained, "spring from the immediate and inexplicable reaction of

³⁴ George Santayana, The Sense of Beauty (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896), p. 203.

³⁵ George Santayana, The Life of Reason (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905-1906).

³⁶ Ibid., I, 6.

of vital impulse, and from the irrational part of our nature,³⁷ but are not to be equated with simple passions or interests. These "passions and interests in themselves are not goods, they are commitments; they may be painful and biologically erratic."³⁸ All values, even harmony and integration, are nevertheless relative to the goals and aspirations of the person.

Santayana later denied having a theory of value; maintaining rather a "doctrine concerning the good, . . . since it professes to be a judgment rather than a description of a fact."³⁹ At first glance his doctrine of "essences" suggests some metaphysical source of value experiences. However, he insists that essences are not metaphysical concepts at all, but merely "the last residuum of scepticism and analysis,"⁴⁰ highly distilled features which are non-existent though manifest as mental elations.

The view that values spring from and are relative to human interests finds some support in George Albert Coe's Education in Religion and Morals.⁴¹ The distinctive difference being Coe's belief that the ultimate source of these inherent

³⁷ Santayana, The Sense of Beauty, p. 17.

³⁸ George Santayana, "Apologia Pro Menta Sua," in The Philosophy of George Santayana, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951), p. 577.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ George Santayana, "A General Confession," in The Philosophy of George Santayana, p. 28.

⁴¹ George Albert Coe, Education in Religion and Morals (Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1904).

structural tendencies is the "immediate presence of God in every human mind."⁴² Coe suggested an educational process, similar to the Socratic method, in which the instructor provides the stimulation, and serves as a mid-wife to deliver the interests and ideas native to the person. In his inaugural address as Professor of Practical Theology at Union Theological Seminary he made this even more explicit by declaring:

Teaching cannot reveal values toward which the mind does not spontaneously strive. A teacher cannot import any absolutely new interest into the mind; he can only intensify an interest already there, or extend the application of it.⁴³

John Dewey and James H. Tufts entered the discussion of values with the publication of their Ethics in 1908.⁴⁴ The direction of Dewey's thought toward the process of problem solving through reflection and selection is evident when he defines moral conduct as "activity called forth and directed by ideas of value or worth, where the values concerned are so mutually incompatible as to require consideration and selection before an overt action is entered upon."⁴⁵ The following year Dewey contributed his concepts of the source and apprehension of moral principles. "All conduct," he wrote, "springs ultimately and radically out of

⁴² Ibid., p. 195.

⁴³ George Albert Coe, Can Religion Be Taught? (New York: Union Theological Seminary, 1909), p. 24.

⁴⁴ John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1908).

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 209.

native instincts and impulses."⁴⁶ He went on to explain how this power, when attracted to valuable ends, will call forth emotional responsiveness. The teacher's role is then to present the goals, give the student an opportunity to select for himself, and provide the means for testing these choices in action. Some years later he defined values as "things immediately having certain intrinsic qualities,"⁴⁷ some of which are possessed and enjoyed, while others raise the problem of choice. The elaboration of this basic process may be found in his "Theory of Valuation."⁴⁸

One of the more prolific writers on value theory in the first quarter of the twentieth century was Wilbur M. Urban. His eclectic volume, Valuation: Its Nature and Laws,⁴⁹ sought to bring the Austrian theories to the attention of a larger audience. He expressed a preference for Meinong's emphasis on "feeling" over Ehrenfels' focus on "desire," but tried to incorporate the several psychological elements in his definition. Value, according to his early work, is "the affective-volitional meaning of the object for the subject in different attitudes."⁵⁰ This limitation of values to the mental processes of man did not satisfy Urban for long.

⁴⁶ John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909), p. 47.

⁴⁷ John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), p. 396.

⁴⁸ John Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, II, No. 4 (1939).

⁴⁹ Wilbur M. Urban, Valuation (London: Swan, Sonnenschein & Co., 1909).

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 27.

His complete reversal, in which he founded the objectivity of values on two a priori postulates, will be discussed in a later section.

The year 1909 witnessed a bumper crop of treatises on value, including Ralph Barton Perry's volume, The Moral Economy.⁵¹ His thesis is that all existence is a matter of relationships, simple or complex. Moral values arise in the more complex relationships where there is great diversity and conflict of interests. From an analysis of the elements of human experience Perry concludes that a simple "interest" is "the root-value, . . . of which all the higher moral values are compounded."⁵² Moral value itself is never attached to an isolated interest, therefore one does not judge, nor condemn the vicissitudes of animal life and inanimate nature.

Later in elaborating his general theory he became more explicit:

If we were to identify 'interest' with this relationship we should be bound to acknowledge the presence of interest even in a pair of gravitating bodies, or in the behavior of a chemical compound, and we should not be aided in our study of value as something peculiarly characteristic of the human and social sciences.⁵³

Perry would not deny that "interest " may occur at any level of the natural order, but he would reserve the concept of value for the area of complex human behavior, following the evolution of the mind. This does not mean that he was

⁵¹ Ralph Barton Perry, The Moral Economy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909).

⁵² Ibid., p. 82.

⁵³ Ralph Barton Perry, General Theory of Value (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1926), p. 153.

not interested in the biological nature of man, for his whole theory is built around the "motor-affective" life. Motor, in this sense, refers to the physiological energy of the body expressing itself through the nervous system.

The primary element of the "motor-affective" life is "an interest, or unit of life, . . . essentially an organization which consistently acts for its own preservation."⁵⁴ He sought for a method to measure quantitatively the energy levels of cooperative and conflicting interests. If he could identify the basic interest component, a "liking" or "disliking," then through addition, multiplication, subtraction, and division he could talk meaningfully of the value a person invests through nerve energy in any particular "object-of-interest." This he was unable to accomplish scientifically.

Though unable to measure the energy components, Perry has had a great influence by defining value in terms of interest or bias. The source of this basic interest must be discovered, if one is to find the source of value, as he defined "value as an object of any interest."⁵⁵ Interests may be inherited, but if so they are highly modifiable. "If they are not inherited," Perry concludes, "we must assume a capacity for their formation."⁵⁶ At any rate, there is a tendency toward interest, which he designates as "a governing propensity, or determining tendency,

⁵⁴ Perry, Moral Economy, p. 11.

⁵⁵ Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 115.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 524.

or general 'set,' which is at any given time in control of the organism as a whole."⁵⁷

Furthermore, this is not a passive state of the individual. The governing tendency, which is similar to the controlling vector in a field of forces, is active through anticipation and interested to the point of providing an occasion in which to fulfill its expectation. It is reaching and pressing toward the "object-of-interest." He defines interest as follows:

An act is interested in so far as its occurrence is due to the agreement between its accompanying expectation and the unfulfilled phases of a governing propensity.⁵⁸

The state or attitude of expectancy is future pointed, taking on the character of an active interest when the anticipated response builds up sufficient energy to demand action. Generally the term interest is used by Perry to cover both the negative and positive dispositions toward action. While these dispositions may not be innate as preferences, they are dynamic tendencies which form the governing propensity.

In The Moral Economy he identified the root-value as "the fulfillment or satisfaction of the particular interest."⁵⁹ He went so far as to substitute desire for interest in stating that "goodness would then consist in the satisfaction of desire."⁶⁰

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 183.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Perry, Moral Economy, p. 82.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

This termination of value in satisfaction was supported by W. H. Sheldon. He approached the matter empirically by accumulating a host of objects, which were deemed valuable, and analyzed them to discover some concrete universal. He found in "all cases that the value of an object consists in its helping to complete or fulfill some tendency already present."⁶¹

Perry soon changed his opinion about value as a terminal relationship. In fact when he writes that "a value will cease to exist when its own sustaining interest is destroyed or altered,"⁶² this implies that satisfaction or fulfillment of the interest brings about its cessation as motor-affective energy.

Some of his critics prefer the earlier view. Dewitt H. Parker noted that although Professor Perry's now famous definition of value as 'any interest in any object' should, in my opinion, be amended to read 'the satisfaction of any interest in any object,' it has the merit of placing the seat of value in what, following Schopenhauer, one may call in a wholly generic sense, the 'will.'⁶³

It is of interest along this line to note the apparent reversal of Bertrand A. Russell's concept of value. In an early essay he maintained that "good and bad are qualities which belong to objects independently of our opinions, just as round

⁶¹ W. H. Sheldon, "An Empirical Definition of Value," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, XI, No. 5 (February 26, 1914).

⁶² Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 140.

⁶³ Dewitt H. Parker, "Reflections on the Crisis in Theory of Value," Ethics, LV (1944-1945), 197.

and square do."⁶⁴ Recently he affirmed that "an occurrence is 'good' when it satisfies desire, or more precisely, that we define 'good' as 'satisfaction of desire.'"⁶⁵ Russell has now reached a conclusion which Perry abandoned years earlier, and for which he gave the following reasons for laying aside:

First, in order to assign value to objects of unfulfilled desire, to unrealized ideals, . . . and to perfection Because, in the second place, I find that even in enjoyment or contentment . . . there is a forward look -- a comparatively effortless, because unimpeded, endeavor to prolong what exists or happens into the immediate future.⁶⁶

The beginning of interest, and subsequently of value, for Perry therefore is in the "motor-affective" attitudes and impulses within human nature. One of his critics, Eliseo Vivas, thinks that Perry places too much emphasis on consciousness as the seat of these interests. In calling attention to the limitations of Perry's behavioristic psychology he states:

Interests have roots in the mud of the id . . . deep beyond the reach of the prying eye of introspective awareness From this source, in interplay between the demands of the external world and the instinctual demands of the inaccessible part of the mind, the interests somehow develop.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Bertrand Russell, "The Elements of Ethics," in his Philosophical Essays (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1910), p. 11.

⁶⁵ Bertrand Russell, Human Society in Ethics and Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1955), p. 36.

⁶⁶ Ralph Barton Perry, "Value as Election and Satisfaction," Journal of Philosophy, XLI, No. 4 (July, 1931), 436.

⁶⁷ Eliseo Vivas, The Moral Life and the Ethical Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950), p. 55.

Whether Vivas is right or wrong in locating the interests below the level of consciousness, Perry is justified, I believe, in calling our attention to the fact that it is at the level of awareness that one has to deal with his interests and values.

2. The Human Organism and Its Consciousness

Among the distinguishing features of man, which gives him a unique place in his world, is "propiscience," the capacity to act in the light of expectation, to anticipate experiences, and to be guided by future possibilities. The fact that this capacity may be shared by some higher animals serves to accentuate the fact that man is integrally related to the natural order. While a product of a more highly developed state of evolution, he is not thought of by Perry as separate from the totality of the real world.

Our knowledge of man is acquired, in part, by observing the behavior of other men. Perry classifies himself with the school of American realists, who he admits are in accord with the psychological school of behaviorism. This movement, he states, goes back to the "old Aristotelian view that we mean by mind only the peculiar way in which a living organism endowed with a central nervous system behaves."⁶⁸ He is not opposed to retaining the term "spirit" in reference to man, but he uses it in the same observable way in describing a human being as he does terms like river or mountain to denote a part of nature. He attempts to prove that

⁶⁸ Ralph Barton Perry, Present Conflict of Ideals (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1918), p. 378.

man is not a discontinuous substance, either physical or ethereal, but rather a "peculiar combination of elements with a peculiar set of properties."⁶⁹

Perry is so concerned to view man as homogeneous with his environment that he uses the term "mind" to include all observable human actions. By equating consciousness with mind he conceives it primarily as selectivity within the world of reality, but not discontinuous from it. In an early essay⁷⁰ he sought to disprove two misconceptions about consciousness. He denied that it could be either a specific "thing" within the world, or a general form of all being. Since "the term consciousness has reference to relativity and exclusion within the world of reals, . . . it cannot signify a principle constitutive of that world itself."⁷¹

Consciousness, according to Perry, is the most general term for defining a self. By the personal self he means a center of selectivity, characterized by its energized interests, and tending towards self preservation within the total flux of the world. Mental activity can never operate without regard to the biological interconnections. The natural mind is described as:

An organization possessing as distinguishable, but complementary, aspects, interest, nervous system, and contents. Or, if interest and nervous system be taken together as constituting the action of mind, we may summarize mind as action and contents.⁷²

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ralph Barton Perry, "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness," The Psychological Review, XI (July-September, 1904), 282-296.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 296.

⁷² Ralph Barton Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies (New York: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1912), p. 304.

The interests, or basic units of life, even though in conflict at times, cohere around a general set or tendency, which acts through the nervous system to attract the contents, otherwise known as "objects-of-interest" into the mind. Consciousness then is made up of the "characteristic activities of the living and neurally integrated organism together with the "objects" to which these address themselves."⁷³

Perry's behaviorism comes through clearly in his latest work, Realms of Value.⁷⁴ He does not distinguish the body and mind as separate entities, but as descriptions of levels of complexity. He states:

The body rises to the level of mind when it acts on its environment in a peculiar way -- when by sensing, perceiving, remembering, thinking, planning, it pursues its interests.⁷⁵

Mind is interpreted functionally as being only what it does. The difference between mind and body is merely the degree of complexity, plus the peculiar activity of the process of reflection. On the lower levels of life the interests and their conflicts are expressed and resolved by trial and error and interconditioning. When the level is reached where the organism pauses to ponder the effects of its actions, then meanings and judgments supersede reflexes. The organism becomes a person when, according to Perry:

⁷³ Ralph Barton Perry, "Reply to Professor Calkins," Journal of Philosophy, XXIV, No. 25 (December, 1927), 684.

⁷⁴ Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954).

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 24.

There is a central clearinghouse where his interests thus take account of one another, and are allowed to proceed only when the demands of other interests are consulted, and wholly or partially met.⁷⁶

The internal principle of the development of order out of chaos of interests is rationality. The accumulation of successful decisions establishes a certain predisposition or moral character. Therefore, morality, which begins in the conflict of interests, moves toward the ideal goal, the harmony of interests for the enhancement of the self. This personal will to action promotes the integration of the personality, which is made up of these sub-personal interests.

Likewise, the social order is composed of personal selves. Morality at this level is the social will promoting the welfare of the social order through the rational resolution of personal conflicts. Consciousness, therefore, whether personal or social, is defined in terms of activity and content. We know the individual and his social environment through observation of and reflection upon behavior. Interests are expressed through actions, which are focused upon the "objects-of-interest" and identified as values.⁷⁷

B. The Object of Interest as the Focus of Value

1. Are External Objects Qualified by Interests?

One of the more ambiguous concepts in Perry's theory of value is the "object-of-interest." In his earlier writings one is led to assume these objects are external

⁷⁶ Perry, Ibid., p. 63.

⁷⁷ Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 115.

to the interested subject. This raises definite metaphysical problems when he states: "That which is an object of interest is eo ipso invested with value."⁷⁸

Just what he meant by this qualification of the object led to a great deal of criticism. Assuming, for the present, that Perry is using the term "object" as external to the valuing subject certain conclusions will follow.

An object has no value, according to this theory, until an interest is directed toward it. He uses the illustration of a target,⁷⁹ and seeks to prove that it is not a target until someone aims at it. This, in itself, plays havoc with common sense and the common understanding of language. However, he appeals to Spinoza, whom he quotes:

In no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything, because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good, because we strive for it, wish for it, long for it, or desire it.⁸⁰

Perry is not alone in this thesis for virtually the same idea was expressed earlier by D. W. Prall, whom he also quotes:

Anything is properly said to have value in case, and only in case, it is the object of the affective motor response which we call being interested in, positively or negatively The being liked, or disliked, of the object is its value For the cat the cream has value, or better and more simply the cat values the cream.⁸¹

⁷⁸
Ibid.

⁷⁹
Ibid., p. 116.

⁸⁰
Ibid., quoting Spinoza, Ethics, Part III, Prop. IX (1901).

⁸¹
Ibid., quoting D. W. Prall, A Study in the Theory of Value (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 3, No. 3; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1921), pp. 215, 227.

The primary difference between Prall and Perry is that the former accentuates the "affective" or feeling part of the motor-affective life, with an accompanying stress on contemplation and intuition. Perry places his emphasis on the "motor" aspect, which is related to desire, following Ehrenfels rather than Meinong.

The motor-affective attitude and selective action toward the object of interest creates its value. In Perry's definition of value he calls it "that special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it."⁸² If an object derives value only from its relationship to a subject, which takes an interest in it, then it follows that no object possesses intrinsic value. He refuses to accept the illustration of the magnet (object) attracting the iron filings (interests), since he is convinced the object has no value (attractiveness) until this character is given to it by the interested subject.

The value of any "object-of-interest" consists only in the fact that it is either desired or rejected. The interest of the subject, either for or against, determines the value of the object. However, any object may be invested with value by any interest. Perry affirms that:

Such interests as that of desultory curiosity, or promiscuous acquisitiveness, may invest anything with value; and there is nothing so precious that its value would not disappear if all needs, likings, and aspirations were extinguished.⁸³

The relativity of value to the situation in which the subject acts with interest

⁸² Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 124.

⁸³ Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 333. }

toward the object affords at least two definitions of value. Either a special tertiary characteristic is added to the object, or a new relationship between subject and object is produced. Perry wants to have it both ways in stating:

We have thus been led to define value as the peculiar relation between any interest and its object; or that special character of an object which consists in the fact that interest is taken in it.⁸⁴

Looking for the moment at the possibility of a tertiary characteristic certain implications follow. Careful analysis of the target illustration, in which Perry says, "any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it; just as anything whatsoever becomes a target when anyone who-soever aims at it,"⁸⁵ leads to the following conclusions. The object, or target, does not change materially, just because someone aims at it. Then what kind of change, if any, is accomplished? It can be assumed the "special character" with which it is now invested is a metaphysical addition giving it value. In this way its primary characteristics, such as physical components, remain the same. Likewise, the secondary, observable characteristics, such as color, remain the same as when it had no "value." Therefore, to affirm a new characteristic, a value, which "attaches promiscuously" to all objects of interest implies at least a tertiary quality.

Wolfgang Köhler, who dedicated his book, The Place of Value in a World of Facts,⁸⁶ to Ralph Barton Perry, admits that he does "not see quite clearly

⁸⁴ Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 124.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 115f.

⁸⁶ Wolfgang Köhler, The Place of Value in a World of Facts (New York: Liveright Publishing Co., 1938).

whether or not a new property is thus attributed to the object when it becomes an object of interest.⁸⁷ He proposes three possible interpretations:

Just as objects are round or tall, events slow or sudden, so some have charm, some are ugly by themselves, independently.

.....

Again, if and in so far as interest of any kind is taken in an object, it acquires new concrete qualities, viz. value-qualities, this might mean an amplification or completion of the subjectivistic theory.

And thirdly, besides the self and its interests, other factors in a field could perhaps also by a vectorial influence of some kind, create value-properties in certain objects.⁸⁸

Perry, in effect, rejects all three of these interpretations. For him, an object has no independent value, but is dependent upon an interest being taken in it. In the second place he does not say that objects acquire concrete qualities. In fact, the objects are not necessarily concrete in themselves. He states conclusively, "That which is valued may or may not exist."⁸⁹ It is in this connection Perry sees the justification of Albrecht Ritschl's theology. He affirms:

That immediate value of God which arises from the love and admiration of man, is founded on the belief in his existence, but it makes no difference to the value whether the belief be true or not, and whether, therefore, God exists or not.⁹⁰

As for the other elements in the situation having any effect on an object's value there would be none, according to Perry's theory, unless precipitated by a

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 88.

⁸⁹ Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 248.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 611.

motor-affective propensity. His use of the term object, without defining it, led many critics to leap to the conclusion he was referring to an external, concrete entity. Having made this assumption they could then criticize the idea of a subjective interest "investing" this object, either metaphysically or mechanically, with value. However, Perry's concern is not with an external object, but with a subjective process in which the "object-of-interest" is internalized within consciousness. The only alternative I can conceive would be to define consciousness in terms of the whole field of the environmental situation. This Perry refuses to do when he defines consciousness as "the most general category defining a self."⁹¹

2. The Internalized Object-of-Interest

To take Perry's illustration of the target one step further one can say, and not be treating him unjustly, that the target does not have to exist "out there" for the person to mentally take aim at it. It may be an imaginary goal or even a misconception. But this in no wise diminishes the value, for it is measured in terms of the "motor-affective" energy pulsing through the nervous system. This is sometimes felt and sometimes comprehended in knowledge, but neither is essential to the value-experience. This theory is both bio-centric and psycho-centric "in the sense that values are held to be functions of certain acts of living mind."⁹² One must keep in mind that for Perry mind is psycho-somatic activity conscious of its

⁹¹ Perry, "Conceptions and Misconceptions of Consciousness," p. 296.

⁹² Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 139.

contents. Interest is the "motor-affective" activity and "objects-of-interest" are the contents.

Viewed from this perspective it is not difficult to see how the mental "object-of-interest" could be invested with a special character, called value. It all takes place within the "mind," and therefore this theory is rightly termed psychological. This gives meaning to Perry's concept that values are "either modes of attitude or impulse, and thus motor; or sensory qualia which are localizable in the body."⁹³

There can be no value, according to this theory, unless there is an object-of-interest. This is the focal point of the interest which generates value. It is "that factor which mediates between a governing propensity and a subordinate act."⁹⁴ These objects can be known like any other psychological facts, but knowledge of them is not required for their functioning. In this a distinction is made between "awareness of" the object, implied in his theory of consciousness, and "cognition of," or knowledge about the object, which he considers secondary to the valuing process. He states, "A value acquires existence when an interest is generated, regardless of any knowledge about it."⁹⁵

Replying to his critics through his later work, Realms of Value, he sought to clear up certain misconceptions about the objects-of-interest. One of these ideas being that the object serves merely as the stimulus or catalyst, which triggers the interest. Perry was concerned to keep the interest firmly related to and dependent

⁹³ Ibid., p. 31.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 229.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 140.

upon the "governing propensity," or the active attitude of the subject, without denying the role of the object. He had to find some way to explain the immanence of the object within the value process. It seemed essential for the object to pervade the activity from beginning to end. If there was no object there could be no interest, hence no value, anywhere along the continuum. He resolved this dilemma by conceiving "the object as the ideal or problematic object which like a law is immanent in the process and determines its movement and direction."⁹⁶

Another problem which had been raised was the relationship of motives and purposes to value. He could not agree to any external motivation or metaphysical ends. They must reside within the person as urges and goals. They could not be equated with all the springs of human conduct, for as Santayana had pointed out some of these were erratic and even harmful to self. He, therefore, identified motive with the problematic object-of-interest, describing it as "the not-as-yet-realized occasion for a consummatory dealing."⁹⁷

The realization of the object-of-interest, which gives it "reality," comes about indirectly. The expectation of the object's occurrence does not produce it. However, this tendency, or motor-affective striving toward the "end" acts toward providing an occasion for its consummation. The understanding of the total situation in which value arises requires an analysis of the relation between the interest and its object.

⁹⁶ Perry, Realms of Value, p. 42.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 45.

C. The Value-Relation Between Any Interest and its Object

Perry's general theory of value may well be summarized in this definition:

Value is thus a specific relation into which things possessing any ontological status whatsoever, whether real or imaginary, may enter with interested subjects.⁹⁸

Here again one is tempted to jump to the conclusion that Perry conceives of this as an external type of relation in which a "real" subject encounters a "real" object within the "real" world. Perry's concept of ontological status must be analyzed to discover what he means by "things."

A clue to his meaning is given in the fact that he allows ontological status to imaginary objects. He confuses the issue by distinguishing between the real and the imaginary in the above definition. Even though he uses words loosely his philosophical point of view coupled with his behavioristic psychology defines his ontological position. A thing "is" as it "acts." Another way of stating this is that an object-of-interest never "is" in itself. Rather, "the object of interest is 'realized' when as an indirect consequence of being expected, it becomes real."⁹⁹

Otis Lee has stated the problem in this question, "How can a value be objectively real, and yet depend in part on our participation for its realization?"¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 116.

⁹⁹Perry, Realms of Value, p. 441.

¹⁰⁰Otis Lee, "Value and Interest," Journal of Philosophy, XLII, No. 6. (March, 1945), 158.

The simple answer is that Perry's metaphysics does not deal with substance and attributes, but only with events and rational situations. Value has no objective reality, but only a subjective relationship of becoming and passing, either through loss of interest, or loss of its object.

The object-of-interest is a mental phenomenon, but it may have an external correlate. At this point Perry's theory of knowledge seems to be at variance with his theory of value. For a thing to be, even to be known, is not the same as to be valued as an object-of-interest. In an early work he affirmed "that the being or nature of things is independent of their possessing value."¹⁰¹ He does not see any necessity for holding the same realistic theory of value as he does of knowledge. He can, therefore, state that "what is known is independent as regards its existence and essential nature, of the act or state of knowledge."¹⁰² On the other hand, values must not be conceived as objectively independent of the subject. By the time he wrote the Realms of Value he is convinced that "the seeming paradox can be escaped only by distinguishing between the object which is 'internal' to the act of cognition, and its 'external' referent."¹⁰³ These are distinguishable by the role they play in truth and error. The internal object is problematic and may never be realized, whereas the external referent is a simple fact or "neutral entity;"

¹⁰¹ Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 332.

¹⁰² Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 139.

¹⁰³ Perry, Realms of Value, p. 39.

"they simply are what they are."¹⁰⁴

When the occasion permits, "A mind embraces certain contents or parts of the environment, with which it deals through its instrumentalities and in behalf of its interests."¹⁰⁵ Value is the relation within the mind of the sustaining interest to its embraced object. The value-relationship, therefore, depends first of all upon a "motor-affective" subject with a "governing propensity," or active attitude ready to express its interest in an appropriate object. When the subject expresses interest in its problematic object then value is produced in the relationship. Value is invested in the object-of-interest, not externally, but in relation to the sustaining interest within the mind of the person.

To the charge this makes his theory purely subjective Perry replies that he has "not defined value as exclusively relative to the present interest of the judge."¹⁰⁶ A community of persons may unite their interests in a common object thus increasing the value. A further way of increasing value is when persons are mutually interested in each other. Intrinsic value is provided in this theory when the value-relation itself becomes the object of interest. To universalize this one need only conceive the universe as being focused upon its order and beauty as objects-of-interest.

¹⁰⁴ Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 316.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 304.

¹⁰⁶ Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 130.

D. The Apprehension of Values

1. The Cognition of Values

In Perry's theory of value sharp lines of demarcation are drawn between the act of valuing, the cognition of values, and the judgment or evaluation of values. The creation of values is not dependent upon cognition, but the judgment of value is so dependent. "To like or dislike an object is to create that object's value," according to Perry, whereas "to be aware that one likes or dislikes an object is to cognize that object's value."¹⁰⁷ Cognition of value is a step removed from the experience even though they may appear to be simultaneous.

Professor Urban denied that Perry's theory could provide for the apprehension of value. At best he said there could be "only knowledge about things and their relations,"¹⁰⁸ with value as the name for a specific relation. This sharpens the issue and lifts up the fact that value apprehension involves making a value my own, whereas merely knowing about it may have little or no effect on my behavior.

Stephen C. Pepper approached the problem from yet another angle.¹⁰⁹ He pointed out the fact of two kinds of values. The "immediate" values, which made their appeal to and were apprehended through interest, and the "standard" values,

¹⁰⁷ Perry, The Moral Economy, p. 153.

¹⁰⁸ Wilbur M. Urban, "Again, the Value Objective and the Value Judgment: Reply to Professor Perry and Dr. Fisher," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, XV, No. 15 (July, 1918), 400.

¹⁰⁹ Stephen C. Pepper, The Equivocation of Value (University of California Publications, Vol. IV; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1923), pp. 107f.

which are universal and appeal only to reason. This equivocation did not please Perry, who believed in the unity of value, exclusively related to interest.

Perry proposed three ways of dealing with the apprehension of values. In the first place he felt a case could be made for the statement, "motor-affective states are themselves modes of apprehension, and that they provide the only faculties by which value can be apprehended."¹¹⁰ A second possibility would be intellectual receptivity to which a motor-affective response would be made. In the third place it might be possible to make value judgments relative to and on behalf of the existing interests.

Values are apprehended, primarily, within the value process where they are created. Perry deals with the implications for higher education in its concern for transmitting values in the following way. The need is to find a method of simultaneously conferring value on the desirable object, while implanting or awakening an interest in the mind of the student. He submits four methods¹¹¹ for creating value, or arousing interest in the desirable object. In the first place, an eligible object may be presented to the senses in the hope that interest will be stimulated. How this is accomplished with ideal or problematic objects he does not say. Should this fail, the teacher should then manifest a personal interest in the eligible object, thereby increasing its apparent value. In the third place, interest may be stimula-

¹¹⁰ Ralph Barton Perry, "Value and Its Moving Appeal," The Philosophical Review, XLI, No. 4 (July, 1932), 339.

¹¹¹ Perry, General Theory of Value, pp. 525f.

ted by means of threatened scarcity or loss of the object. As a last resort, the desired interest may be isolated by either satisfying or deadening all other interests.

These methods could be submitted for experimentation within the university and their effectiveness evaluated. Whether or not they work is of less importance than the matter of deciding which value-relations, or objects-of-interest should be encouraged.

2. The Judgment of Values

One of the outstanding characteristics of Perry's value theory is the importance he places upon the investigation of value in the generic sense. A great many theories make assumptions, either overtly or covertly, about the source of values and then proceed immediately into building a system or hierarchy of categories of things which have been considered valuable. Most of Perry's energy was spent in analyzing his basic assumption that interest, the "pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, . . . is the original source of all value."¹¹² He nevertheless noted the necessity of moving on to analyze the intellectual acts involved in the process, as well as a "nicer regard for the role of judgment in interest."¹¹³

Judgment can be thought of in at least two ways, and it is especially essential to keep these separate in dealing with the psychological theories of value. In

¹¹² Ralph Barton Perry, "Economic Value and Moral Value," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXX (May, 1916), 449.

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 450.

all theories there will occur ex post facto judgments about that which was or was not deemed valuable. This is the method of value comparison. Perry makes little use of value judgments in this sense, as he prefers to measure values quantitatively according to their "correctness, intensity, preference and inclusiveness."¹¹⁴ It might be argued that correctness is a qualitative judgment to be gauged by whether it is right or wrong according to a standard of truth. Perry affirms, however, that error of judgment does not lessen the value of the interest-object relationship. He only concedes "that a mistaken interest is relatively unstable because the . . . subject will sooner or later be convinced of his error,"¹¹⁵ thereby losing interest and minimizing value.

In another sense judgment is always present as a mediating factor in the value process. While holding that interest itself is the determining factor, which makes a neutral object either "good" or "bad," there is a place for judgment, or expectation, to mediate the interest. As an example of this he states:

To desire that there shall be money in my purse signifies that the act of dealing with money is in agreement with a governing propensity such as avarice or need, which predisposes me to its performance independently of my response to the purse. The opening of the purse, possessing the function of releasing the money response, may occur then because of this fact, or because of what is expected of it. If when I open the purse I see or handle money, my judgment is fulfilled because what I expected has happened; and my interest is satisfied because what happened also harmonizes with my governing propensity.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 611.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 614.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 345.

Perry's conclusion is that he can judge that money is in the purse without desiring it, but he could not desire it before expecting it. It might be argued that this is a judgment of fact, not a judgment of value. It is a fact he needed or desired that he have money in his purse, however the expectation that money was in the purse could have been a mistaken judgment, not a definite fact.

3. The Comparison of Values

Even though Perry applies the general theory of value to various realms, he does not distinguish them as greater or more important qualitatively. For example, moral and spiritual values are not given a higher status than economic values. Rather he approached religion quantitatively, as being more inclusive. He affirms that religion "in some sense deals with the aggregate of all values, as their custodian or champion in the world at large."¹¹⁷ It is not a specific type, but the overarching grouping in which all values find their place. The same is true of morality. In a vivid phrase he described morality as "the massing of interests against a reluctant cosmos."¹¹⁸ Statements such as these led Edgar S. Brightman to conclude that for Perry "there is nothing present in the moral or other higher values that is not given in interest as a biological unity, except quantity."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

¹¹⁸ Perry, The Moral Economy, p. 14.

¹¹⁹ Edgar S. Brightman, "Neo-Realistic Theories of Value," in Studies in Philosophy and Theology, edited by E. C. Wiln (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1922), p. 46.

For Perry "the moral drama opens when interest meets interest; . . . (and) a plurality of interests becomes an economy, or community of interests."¹²⁰ The realms of nature and society can be conceived as great conglomerations of competing interests. How order is achieved within this chaos, if only the motor-affective energies are considered determinative factors, is hard to understand.

Actually, Perry modified this thesis by introducing the factor of reason as the arbiter for progress toward harmony and order. "Strictly speaking," he wrote, "there is only one internal principle of progress, namely, rationality."¹²¹ He, therefore, seems to oscillate between a quantitative measurement of intensity and duration of interests, and an appeal to clear thinking. On the one hand there are the motor-affective propensities, either instincts or capacities for response, and on the other reasoning from learned behavior which stabilizes each newly manifest interest, making cooperation possible. The question behaviorism leaves unanswered is how the internal rational principle plays the role of coordinator if, like other elements of the mind, it is only the sum of certain actions, whose basic units are simple interests. Somehow man must be shown to have, not only the capacity to be interested, but the capacity to decide between conflicting interests and competing objects-of-interest. Perry, unlike John Dewey, has not made a central place for reflection in his theory. This is perhaps because he was so anxious to keep interest and value independent of thought; to let interest constitute value, and thought to

¹²⁰ Perry, The Moral Economy, p. 13.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 134.

cognize it.

This bifurcation led to the necessity for two approaches to the apprehension of values. In one approach an appeal is made to the motor-affective attitudes below the level of cognition, and in the other an appeal is made to reason which is to correct and expand the mediating judgments or expectations which promote interests. Subliminal advertizing illustrates the first approach, even though it may have certain moral implications relative to conventional concepts of individual freedom. The second method, referred to earlier,¹²² appeals to reason through precept and example. Perry seeks to unify these approaches by viewing them as:

The unceasing process by which whether consciously or unconsciously the motor-affective dispositions of an individual, his attachment to this or his repugnance of that, are generated and altered by the play of the natural and social environment.¹²³

The psychological theories seem to be lacking at the point of value standards. Perry's focus is almost entirely on what is, and is evasive at the point of setting up criteria of what ought to be. Instead of a sense of ought there is the tendency of expectation, which will be either fulfilled or thwarted by the steady march of events.

¹²² Supra, p. 43.

¹²³ Perry, General Theory of Value, pp. 524f.

CHAPTER III

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VALUE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO PITIRIM A. SOROKIN'S "INTEGRAL THEORY OF VALUE"

A. The Objective Source of Values

1. Values as Absolutes

Near the beginning of the twentieth century in England an effort was made by G. E. Moore¹²⁴ to prove that values were absolute and objective. He considered them to be logically primitive in nature, and to adhere in objects as qualities incapable of further analysis.

The center of concern with value theory in America, at the time, was Harvard University. A lively discussion was in progress between men like William James, Josiah Royce, George Santayana, and Ralph Barton Perry. This dialogue was enriched when Hugo Münsterberg of Germany, a disciple of Herman Lotze, joined the faculty. Aware of the subjectivism, which Lotze had encouraged through his philosophical approach to value, Münsterberg sought to find an absolute ground for value. He reasoned that experience could be interpreted in only two ways. Either it was ephemeral, with no connected meaning, or else it belonged to

¹²⁴

G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: University Press, 1903).

a world which was absolutely valuable. He concluded:

If it is a world at all, it must be absolutely valuable, that is, it must satisfy the pure will, because it becomes a world only by its self-assertion, that is by its identical recurrence, and this identity means fulfilment, means satisfaction, means value.¹²⁵

The world, and each of its particulars, assert themselves through identical recurrence, moment by moment. According to this view, there are four types of values revealed in this absolute world. First, each part remains identical through changing events and is therefore true; each is in agreement with other parts in forming the world and is therefore beautiful; each part changes only in the realization of its own meaning and is thereby good; and each participates in the completion of the world as the full satisfaction of the will, which is the unity of all values. This places values in neat compartments and restates the famous Greek trilogy. However, this thesis must be viewed in the light of Münsterberg's basic assumption that "every evaluation and every preference evidently presupposes a will which takes an attitude and which finds its satisfaction."¹²⁶ If absoluteness is relative to will, it is difficult to make a case for the assumption that all the wills in the world want truth, beauty, goodness, and unity, and could be satisfied with anything less. To avoid this dilemma of individual preferences he affirmed, as a priori, the evaluating "all-will" which seeks identity through recurrence.

¹²⁵ Hugo Münsterberg, The Eternal Values (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909), p. 79.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

The immediately experienced sources of values, for Münsterberg, are the naïve evaluations of individuals out of which arise the purposive efforts of the culture. In analyzing and describing the values he believed that "we must separate the values which naïve life posits from the values which civilization posits intentionally."¹²⁷ In turn the four types of values, identity, agreement, realization, and completion, may be posited, or willed, either naïvely or intentionally. He developed a system of twenty-four values from these eight possibilities by providing that each may be apprehended in three fields: "the outer world, . . . our fellow world, or . . . our inner world."¹²⁸ Each of these fields, nature, society, and persons are expressions of the infinite "all-will" or over-self. This is not an assertion based on knowledge, but on conviction. Therefore, Münsterberg has not really escaped the subjective value statements of Lotze, even though affirming the absolute.

A brief but penetrating article by Professor W. P. Montague¹²⁹ discussed values from the point of view of the organism's adjustment to its environment. Truth is cognitive value which comes from the adjustment of the perceptions and judgments to environmental facts. The Good is conative value resulting from the adjustment of desires to facts. And Beauty is affective value yielded by the spontaneous adaptation of the individual's needs and the environmental facts to one

127

Ibid., p. 80.

128

Ibid.

129

W. P. Montague, "The True, the Good, and the Beautiful from a Pragmatic Point of View," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, VI, No. 9 (April, 1909).

another. Values are to be found within the process of adjustment between the subject and its environment. His elaboration of this thesis came about thirty years later, when the contextual approach to values held the spotlight.

The volume of articles and books written in 1909 led J. S. Moore to conclude that it "was marked by the birth of a new philosophical discipline--the philosophy of value."¹³⁰ From our vantage point today it appears more like the rapid growth of an adolescent, spreading awkwardly in many directions. Even Bertrand Russell joined the chorus of those seeking to establish the objectivity of values. As noted in the preceding chapter,¹³¹ he later decided he had spoken too hastily, in stating that values were independent qualities of objects.

In the confusion Wilbur M. Urban reversed his field from the concept of value as an "affective-volitional" attitude of the subject toward the object. By ruling out the possibilities of value as a subject-object relationship, and a quality of the object, he opened the way for proposing Alexis von Meinong's concept of "value as an objective."¹³² He believed that two value propositions could be made about objects a priori. In the first place "every object falls under the category of value just as necessarily as under the category of being."¹³³ And secondly, "every

¹³⁰J. S. Moore, "The System of Values," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, VII, No. 11 (May 26, 1910), 282.

¹³¹Supra, p. 25.

¹³²Wilbur M. Urban, "Value and Existence," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, XIII, No. 17 (August 17, 1916), 461.

¹³³Wilbur M. Urban, "Knowledge of Value and the Value Judgment," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, XIII, No. 25 (December 7, 1916), 675.

value stands in a system of higher and lower."¹³⁴ This new line of reasoning affirms that value, like being, is a universal proposition, "not definable in terms of anything else."¹³⁵

Value, being an "objective," or rational proposition, simply is and has no source other than the value-judgments, through which it is also recognized and apprehended. D. W. Fisher disagreed with Urban's equation of "value" with Meinong's "objective," and explained Meinong's term as follows:

If we judge 'A exists,' we apprehend in the act of judgment the object A, and also the objective, 'that A exists.' . . . An objective may then be characterized sufficiently as the whole of what we apprehend by means of a judgment.¹³⁶

The proposition that "A exists" is the recognition of the universal category of being. Urban believed the proposition "that A exists" was a universal value-judgment establishing the objectivity of the category of value. Value theory, like all philosophy, tends to become entangled in semantics.

2. Values as Relative to the Situation

The relativity of value to any given situation was defended during this early period by H. W. Schneider. The situation included the valuable object, the

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 677.

¹³⁵ Urban, "Again, the Value Objective and the Value Judgment," p. 397.

¹³⁶ D. W. Fisher, "Professor Urban's Value-Theory," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, XIV, No. 21 (October 11, 1917), 571.

person or activity which valued it, and the end or purpose of its value. In this context "value appears essentially as that quality of an object by virtue of which it becomes a means to an end."¹³⁷ Accordingly, values are instruments, which can be discovered, organized and utilized to promote human progress toward desirable ends within particular situations. The primary role of education is to develop within students the technique of accurate evaluation of his situation that he may employ those values which will help him reach his goals.

Another theory affirming the objectivity of values, but differing in its method of apprehension, was set forth in 1918 by E. G. Spaulding. He classified value theories into those which are wholly dependent upon consciousness, and his own view that some values are independent of consciousness. He equated the "totality of values, both existent and subsistent,"¹³⁸ with duty. Values could be received either unconsciously or through reason, and often as commands "to go counter to the desires and impulses that are causally and instinctively rooted in human nature."¹³⁹

An attempt to objectively study values was begun in 1931 through the use of a questionnaire. The purpose of the study was "to measure the relative prominence of six basic interests or motives in personality . . . based directly upon Edward

¹³⁷ H. W. Schneider, "The Theory of Values," Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, XIV, No. 6 (March 15, 1917), 148.

¹³⁸ E. G. Spaulding, The New Rationalism (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1918), p. 517.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 501.

Spranger's Types of Men.¹⁴⁰ The results were not developed into a theory of the source of the interests, but Allport has defined values as "the termini of our intentions."¹⁴¹ His conclusion was that "the most comprehensive units in personality are broad intentional dispositions, future pointed."¹⁴² Recently he has denied that these interests are instinctual, thus allowing for their production and apprehension through social experience. "Starting fairly early in our lives, we are propelled," he maintains, "not by instincts but by interests."¹⁴³ These interests are acquired through experience in the social milieu. He seems to indicate that values may be culturally transmitted without committing himself to any more than a description of his observations.

B. Culture as the Source of Values

1. The Integral Theory of Value

The cultural determination and transmission of values found its most ardent supporter in Pitirim A. Sorokin. He conceives of values not as objective, irreducible data common to all cultures, but rather factors relative to each system. They

¹⁴⁰ Gordon W. Allport and P. E. Vernon, Study of Values (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1931), p. 3.

¹⁴¹ Gordon W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 90.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 92.

¹⁴³ Gordon W. Allport, "A Basic Psychology of Love and Hate," in his Personality and Social Encounter (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 208.

are determined by the philosophical conceptions of reality held in each culture. Different cultural systems have radically different aims and values according to their theories of the ultimate nature of man and his universe.

This integral theory of values grew out of Sorokin's study of the history and nature of social systems. He portrayed the whole landscape in the four volumes entitled, Social and Cultural Dynamics,¹⁴⁴ published between 1937 and 1941. He sought to empirically analyze the great ideological cultural systems of man's history, which he referred to as supersystems. To each system he posed the question: What is the ultimate nature of reality and consequently the supreme value? In reply three basic answers were given:

To the Sensate ethics of happiness belong all ethical systems which regard sensate happiness as the supreme value and make everything else a means for its achievement and quantitative and qualitative increase.

According to the Ideational ethics of absolute principles, the supreme objective of life is a realization of the highest value -- for instance with God, salvation of soul, truth, goodness, beauty, for their own sakes, regardless of whether or not such a realization leads to an increase of happiness

Between the noblest systems of eudaemonism and that of the ethics of principles, . . . one is merged organically with the order, in the form of the Idealistic system of ethics.¹⁴⁵

The supreme value, for Sorokin, which has been exemplified in the world,

¹⁴⁴ Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics (New York: American Book Company, 1937 - 1941).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., II, 484ff.

is the "ethics of Love, . . . a variety of the ethics of absolute principles And above all values it puts the value of infinite, unlimited, sacrificing love of God, and of all the concrete individuals."¹⁴⁶ Most of his more recent efforts have been to increase the quantity of love in contemporary culture. His thesis, that values spring from and are modified by cultural conditioning, is sometimes lost within the avalanche of words about the supra-sensory, supra-rational, transcendental concepts. In the final analysis, however, he does not affirm, nor deny the reality of the God of love. He merely states the opinion that a culture, which places its values on such convictions, has the greater survival value.

In arriving at this evaluation of cultures he has recorded volumes of illustrative materials and organized them into the philosophy of "Integralism." Integralism is man's attempt to grasp the totality of reality. Sorokin admits, however, "in its inexhaustible plenitude the total reality is inaccessible to the finite mind."¹⁴⁷ In its rough outlines man can grasp it through three modes: the senses, the reason, and the intuition. Contrary to some theories, he does not limit each member of the trilogy, truth, beauty and goodness, to any particular mode of apprehension. For example, the integral theory of truth is all inclusive:

The empirico-sensory aspect of it is given by the truth of the senses; the rational aspect, by the truth of reason; the super-rational aspect by the truth of faith.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁶Ibid., II, 485.

¹⁴⁷Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Integralism is My Philosophy," in This is My Philosophy, edited by Whit Burnett (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 180.

¹⁴⁸Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, IV, p. 763.

To focus on any one aspect to the extent the other two are limited is to fail to grasp the whole of reality.

2. Contemporary Sensate Value Systems

Sorokin's analysis of our present day western culture is that it is founded on a predominantly sensate system of truth and therefore cannot remain stable. Manifestations of this instability can be seen in the "progressive obliteration of the boundary line between truth and falsehood, reality and fiction, validity and utilitarian convention."¹⁴⁹

According to him we are now living in the twilight zone of a sensate culture in its dying days. Cultural change is brought about when the predominant values can no longer unify the society. To get modern western civilization in focus he reviews the rise and fall of past super-cultural systems. Certain ones like "the integrated culture of Brahamic India, the Buddhist and Taoist cultures, Greek culture from the eighth to the end of the sixth century B.C., "¹⁵⁰ were united ideationally by their particular concepts of God and reality. This was also true of the western medieval culture. The decline of the medieval culture is attributed to the rise, at the beginning of the twelfth century, of a new major principle, "that the true reality and value is sensory."¹⁵¹ The following two centuries were idealistic,

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., IV, 765.

¹⁵⁰ Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Crisis of Our Age (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1946), p. 19.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

a mixture of the ideational with the sensate values. Beginning roughly in the sixteenth century the sensory principle became dominant, resulting in today's 'sensory, empirical, secular, and 'this-worldly' culture. "152

Sensate values are now in the crisis stage, rapidly becoming atomized and disintegrating through selfish interests. Sorokin predicts:

In the increasing moral, mental, and social anarchy and decreasing creativeness of Sensate mentality, the production of the material values will decline, depressions will grow worse, and the material standard of living will go down. 153

Wars, revolutions and revolts will grow bigger and bloodier as men fight for a share of the sensory goods. Disillusionment, or perhaps fear of total annihilation, supposedly will drive western man to see the folly of sensory values and cause him to shift his allegiance. Sorokin's hope is that a new resurgence of altruistic love, as the integrating value, will transform modern culture. Precedence for this being expected was established by

the great crisis of the Sensate Greco-Roman culture (which) was ended through the emergence and growth of Christianity and the great Christian culture of the Middle Ages. 154

From the integralist point of view, sensory, rational and intuitive values all have their place in the balanced scheme of things, and violent antagonism between is unnecessary. Even the moral and religious values "are derived from the society

152 Ibid., p. 20.

153 Sorokin, Social and Cultural Dynamics, IV, 777.

154 Ibid., IV, 779.

and culture in which one is born and reared."¹⁵⁵ The apprehension of these values is through impressions repeatedly made through cultural contacts. Sorokin affirms that "values are inculcated through reaction to the sociocultural milieu."¹⁵⁶

This thesis is expanded in his analogy between the society and the individual. Personality will be structured along the lines of the individual's social situation. He can state the conviction that "the life-drama of each individual is indeed a microcosm reflecting the gigantic sociocultural processes in which he is embedded."¹⁵⁷ There would be, therefore, four personality types: the ideational, overstressing spiritual values; the sensate, overstressing sensory values; the idealistic, seeking a balance between spiritual and sensory values; and the eclectic, an unresolved mixture of disconnected values. He believes the latter type of person "tends to disintegrate or to experience a regression to nihilism, skepticism, cynicism, or even animalism."¹⁵⁸

Before moving to the reconstruction of the human and social situation, which Sorokin proposes, a look at recent socio-psychological theories will place his ideas in clearer perspective.

¹⁵⁵ Pitirim A. Sorokin, Man and Society in Calamity (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1943), p. 228.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ Pitirim A. Sorokin, Society, Culture, and Personality (New York: Harper & Bros., 1947), p. 723.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 634.

C. Socio-Psychological Theories of Value

In Wolfgang Köhler's theory of vectors in a contextual field he states:

Experience shows that sometimes vectors (values) do issue from other persons and from objects, such as tasks, and that the self feels himself the target of many such demands.¹⁵⁹

Likewise George Boas presents a suggestive approach to the source of "intrinsic" values within persons and cultural artifacts. He notes:

It has been observed that obsolete instruments take on terminal value. The so-called fine arts were, so far as we know their history, useful arts in their origin.¹⁶⁰

He draws the conclusion that the apparent chasm between a value and a fact is bridged by the habits of men.

Values, as culturally determined, find support in the studies of Bronislaw Malinowski. He affirms that values have emerged in the evolutionary struggle, and have their prototypes in the behavior of animals, as they focus on favored objects and activities. He means by value "the acquired realization of instrumental imperatives."¹⁶¹ These values are transmitted through magic, religion, art and knowledge. They serve as the organizing principles for individual and social units.

¹⁵⁹ Köhler, op. cit., p. 91.

¹⁶⁰ George Boas, "Habit, Fact, and Value," The Journal of Philosophy, XXXVI, No. 19 (September 14, 1939), 527.

¹⁶¹ Bronislaw Malinowski, Freedom and Civilization (New York: Roy Publishers, 1944), p. 130.

C. I. Lewis, in his monumental work, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, prefers to use the term value "exclusively in the sense of a value-quality, value-character or value-property of something."¹⁶² He distinguishes the "inherent" values from the ephemeral "instrumental" in that the former "are resident in objects in such wise that they are realizable in experience through presentation of the object itself to which they are attributed."¹⁶³ The source of the value-qualities, as any other property, is the same as the object itself -- a product of nature or culture. They are apprehended in the process whereby the object is valued by the subject.

The Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard University has begun the systematic study of values in the major cultures of the world. A theory, which relates values to action, is being projected from the mass of data. Clyde Kluckhohn and his associates have arrived at both a sociological and a psychological definition of value. Sociologically they state:

A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action.¹⁶⁴

The alternative psychological definition affirms:

¹⁶²C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Ill.: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 393.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 391.

¹⁶⁴Clyde Kluckhohn et al., "Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action," in Toward a General Theory of Action, edited by Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), 395.

Value may be defined as that aspect of motivation which is referable to standards, personal or cultural, that do not arise solely out of immediate tensions or immediate situations.¹⁶⁵

Their basic assumption is that the person, or group, strives to achieve a goal. In the process one is oriented toward objects in three modes or ways. The cognitive mode takes in the whole situation and differentiates between objects as to their ability to meet needs. The cathetic mode, derived from the term cathexis, or attitude, is a short-term immediate response in which the actor places affective significance upon the object. The theory is that the process always begins with cathexes until some conflict arises between them, which is then referred to the evaluative mode for resolution. The basis of evaluation is the relation between means and ends, and is decided on pragmatic grounds. They either work or they don't work in achieving goals. In the cognitive mode knowledge claims are determined as true or false in either of two ways. There can be verification through their relations to empirical principles, or validation in terms of the principles of logic.

Values then for this theory of action are abstract ideas or standards, which have proven their merit in cultural conflicts. They may be apprehended either as conscious concepts, attitudinal responses, or pragmatic evaluations.

W. R. Catton, Jr., would modify Kluckhohn's definition of values to read: "A value is a conception of the desirable which is implied by a set of preferential

¹⁶⁵
Ibid., p. 425.

responses to symbolic desiderata."¹⁶⁶ He does not believe we can know or study values directly. They are inferential constructs, like gravity. However, he affirms that "by knowing something about the forces that produce observed regularities we know how to go about looking for previously unobserved patterns."¹⁶⁷

Another philosopher, Otto von Merring, who has studied the data, is convinced that values are more than conceptions. He believes a certain commitment is involved, which some ideas do not have. He conceives values as emerging "from a meaningful relationship between valuing itself and concurrent and subsequent action."¹⁶⁸ Beginning with an open world of value possibilities the person lives through a series of repeated valuing experiences, until these become internalized "truths" for him.

A cultural anthropologist, James K. Feibleman, has coined a phrase, "connotative inference,"¹⁶⁹ to describe the manner in which values are deduced and constructed into a system. In this way intuition, insight and imagination can be accounted for in ways which "denotative inference," such as logic, cannot do. His objective is to demonstrate "how there can occur in cultures a process akin to

¹⁶⁶W. R. Catton, Jr., "Theory of Value," American Sociological Review, XXIV (June, 1959), 312.

¹⁶⁷Franz Adler and W. R. Catton, Jr., "Reply with Rejoinder to W. R. Catton's 'Theory of Value,'" American Sociological Review, XXV (February, 1960), 188.

¹⁶⁸Otto von Merring, A Grammar of Human Values (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1960), p. 71.

¹⁶⁹James K. Feibleman, "Toward an Analysis of the Basic Value System," American Anthropologist, LVI (1954), 426.

what happens when a thought gives rise to a feeling."¹⁷⁰ When a university is able to instill its values in its students, and receive their devotion in return, then the students come to feel its values. Connotation is indirect communication, and he believes that direct communication of values is impossible. He sums up his thesis in these words:

Values are concretized ontological symbols and they come into existence in a culture when the responses of exceptionally gifted individuals are projected into unknown areas. For other individuals the acquisition of such values result from the acquisition of learned responses.¹⁷¹

There are three kinds of language symbols used in communication, according to Feibleman. Logical symbols are used to speak of universals, actual-object symbols for particulars, and axial symbols in the connotation of values, theology and the arts. The great need in value study is a method for measuring quality, according to him, as we have mathematics for measuring quantity.

D. The Reconstruction of Human Values

The need for a method to measure qualitative value is not felt in the Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism presided over by Sorokin.¹⁷² Altruism is referred to in quantative terms as "love-energy." Like other forms of energy, love can be produced in quantity, and stored in individuals, social institutions and

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 427.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 432.

¹⁷² Pitirim A. Sorokin, Studies of Harvard Research Center in Creative Altruism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1956).

cultures. The method for storing surplus love in individuals is through habit, where love actions are "interiorized and rooted to such an extent that they become a second nature."¹⁷³ Likewise social institutions and cultural systems may be so permeated with love that they "would form a permanent atmosphere that would pervade all human beings from the cradle to the grave."¹⁷⁴ Admitting Sorokin's culturally determined personalities the end result would be individuals in perfect love one with the other.

In the interim, until this utopia is realized, this love-energy, in whatever amounts available, "can be directed to those groups or persons who at any given moment need it most."¹⁷⁵ Sorokin, in all seriousness, proposes a method resembling assembly line techniques for the production, storage, and distribution of altruism. He holds the firm conviction that western culture can be reoriented "through an increased production, accumulation, and circulation of an unselfish, creative love in man and in today's human universe."¹⁷⁶

The question arises as to how altruism, the supreme integral value, is to be produced and from what source? Sorokin's answer, in brief, is that "love, in all its forms, is produced by the interaction of human beings."¹⁷⁷ In his studies of

¹⁷³
Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁷⁴
Ibid., p. 72.

¹⁷⁵
Ibid.

¹⁷⁶
Sorokin, "Integralism in My Philosophy," p. 187.

¹⁷⁷
Pitirim A. Sorokin (ed.), Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), p. 61.

American good neighbors and Christian saints¹⁷⁸ he finds evidence for this thesis. These good neighbors were those selected and sent orchids by the committee for the late Tom Breneman's "Breakfast in Hollywood" radio program.¹⁷⁹ They had been recommended by their neighbors. A second group of 112 were selected by Harvard students as the most altruistic persons they knew.¹⁸⁰ The saints were those listed in Herbert S. J. Thurston's revision of Alban Butler's book, The Lives of the Saints.¹⁸¹

When the good neighbors were asked to indicate the factors which influenced them toward altruism, 29 percent recorded family influence, 21 percent religion, 11 percent their own actions and experiences, 8 percent school education, 3 percent unusual specific experiences, and less than 1 percent mentioned books.

The study of the saints indicated 65 percent were positively encouraged by parental attitudes and family situations. The others were influenced largely by other persons and religious institutions. About 20 percent related catastrophic conversions. From the data Sorokin concludes that love can be defined as:

A meaningful interaction--or relationship--between two or more persons where the aspirations and aims of one person are shared and helped in their realization by other persons.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁸ Pitirim A. Sorokin, Altruistic Love (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950).

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁸¹ Alban Butler, The Lives of the Saints (London: Burns, Oates, and Washburne, Ltd., 1926).

¹⁸² Sorokin, Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior, p. 23.

The assumption that love can be produced in the process of personal interaction raises the more penetrating question of its ultimate source. Sorokin is vague at this point but suggests certain possibilities. For example:

The biological, or somatic, causation of altruism and egoism is still unproved. It is possible that there is some connection; but what it is and how close it is is virtually indeterminate.¹⁸³

From the ontological point of view, he related, without affirming, that some have traced the source of love to:

The unifying physical forces of gravitation, or the unification of electrons and protons in the atom, of chemical affinity, of magnetism, and so on, as the manifestation of love-energy acting in the physical world; the 'instincts' of sociality or gregariousness, biological mutual aid and cooperation, as the manifestation of love-energy in the organic world; conscious love, sympathy, friendship, solidarity, as its manifestation in the psychological world.¹⁸⁴

Within his account of these explorations he gave space to the suggestions of the parapsychologists, who affirm:

Love thus, has, as it were, its own department in the universe. It belongs to a mental realm of energetics that, while capable of interacting with the space-time universe, is able also in some degree to disengage itself from the restrictions of time and space.¹⁸⁵

Further analysis of documented cases of spontaneous telepathy led to the conclusion that in 75 percent of the 702 cases studied "the crucial relationship seemed

¹⁸³Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Reconstruction of Humanity (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), p. 71.

¹⁸⁴Sorokin, Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior, p. 11.

¹⁸⁵J. B. Rhine, "Parapsychology and the Study of Altruism," in Sorokin, Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior, p. 171.

to be dominated by love or strong friendship, in the sense that a strong emotional bond was present of the sort that normally yields altruistic behavior."¹⁸⁶

An extra-sensory, extra-rational source of value is indicated for Sorokin in those moments of intuition of all the seers, sages and creative geniuses. They unanimously testify that this experience comes from some "creative source far transcending their sensory and rational capacity."¹⁸⁷

He does not identify this creative force other than by the names, to which it has been attributed in various cultures, such as, Tao, Yen, Zen, "the Kingdom of God," and Plato's realm of "ideas-forms." The ultimate source of "love-energy" is not the primary problem for Sorokin. His main concern is to accept the evidence from the behavioral sciences that love is manifest in human relations, and that it makes a decided difference within the culture. He proposes a plan whereby mankind can apprehend this value, nurture it, increase its quantity, and share it with those in need.

The integral theory of value provides for apprehension at all levels of reality, and the integration of values in a unified person and a transformed culture. The individual, according to this view, has four levels of consciousness through which love may be received. Through the unconscious the human being is related

¹⁸⁶ D. S. Kahn, "Extrasensory Perception and Friendly Interpersonal Relations," in Sorokin, Explorations in Altruistic Love and Behavior, p. 184.

¹⁸⁷ Pitirim A. Sorokin, "Reply to Professor Weisskopf," in New Knowledge in Human Values (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), p. 227.

with the "forces of the inorganic cosmos."¹⁸⁸ At the second level biological tensions stimulate awareness and the bioconscious energies come into play. The socioconscious energies assume as many "egos, roles, and activities as there are sociocultural groups with which, voluntarily or not, he is connected."¹⁸⁹ The supraconscious transcends the ego entirely and unconditionally through intuition. The well integrated person is one who, through self-identification with the supreme value, "love," has become so permeated at every level of his being that his overt actions express this incarnation even in unguarded moments.

Love and all the partial values express themselves through various modes of reality upon which they are somehow superimposed. Man's apprehension of these value-realities is three-fold. Sorokin describes them as follows:

The empirical kind of reality values become a part of our sensory life . . . as a stream of diverse pains and pleasures, sensations and perceptions, images and memories, emotions and feelings, biological tensions and relaxations.

.....

The rational reality-values are represented by all the rational phenomena discovered and created by the rational or a consistent logico-mathematical thought of man.

.....

The suprasensory-suprarational form of reality-values . . . are given to us by true suprasensory-suprarational 'intuition,' 'divine inspiration,' or 'flash of enlightenment.'¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁸ Pitirim A. Sorokin, The Ways and Power of Love (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), p. 85.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 89.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 225f.

The mission of man in the universe is to apprehend reality-values through his senses, reason and intuition, and through altruistic action to increase and distribute love-energy within his culture. The criterion of evaluation is therefore quantitative.

The reconstruction of human values will result from the unity of all values within the framework of altruism. The integral system of reality-values, if accepted, and interiorized by man and his culture will, according to Sorokin, be "the most powerful antidote against the continuation of man's present moral anarchy."¹⁹¹ The conviction that this is within the power of human effort to accomplish, while denied by many contemporary observers, is responsible, in part, for this renewed interest in the study of values.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 232.

CHAPTER IV

ONTOLOGICAL THEORIES OF VALUE WITH PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO PAUL TILLICH'S "BEING AND LOVE"

A. The Transcendental-Ideal Source of Values

The ontological theory of values, like the psychological and sociological, had its representative on the Harvard University faculty at the end of the nineteenth century. Josiah Royce, a student and later colleague of William James, did not hesitate to affirm that the "true life is hid with the cause and belongs to the eternal."¹⁹² Even though often critical of James' pragmatism, he borrowed a phrase from him to define "loyalty," which he considered the supreme value. "Loyalty," he wrote, "is the Will to Believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of the human being."¹⁹³

In England, meanwhile, a series of distinguished Gifford lecturers were affirming the ideal source of values from the point of view of the Eternal Will. Bernard Bosanquet, in his first lectures, sought to prove the thesis by an appeal to coherence between reality, reason, and value within the experienced world. He

¹⁹² Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908), p. 348.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p. 357.

affirmed that the "objects of our likings possess as much satisfactoriness --which we identify with value--as they possess of reality and trueness."¹⁹⁴

Virtually the same thesis was held by the next lecturer, A. Seth Pringle-Pattison. He wanted, however, to show that "it is from the ideals present and operative in man's life that we draw our criterion of value."¹⁹⁵ The structures of the universe, including evolutionary development, and the coherence revealed to man's consciousness, provide the evidence that ideal values are realized. He honestly admitted the whole system rested upon the assumption of man's importance in the scheme of things. He stated:

Without this absolute judgment of value, . . . how could we con-
vince ourselves that, in our estimates, it is not we who judge as finite
particulars, but Reality affirming, through us, its inmost nature."¹⁹⁶

The divine source of values was affirmed, likewise, by W. R. Sorley in his Gifford lectures. They exist in "an ideal realm, very imperfectly realized in our experience, and only incompletely conceived in our consciousness."¹⁹⁷ He did not indicate how he was able to conceive their perfection. For him, however, man was not a passive medium. He must work for the realization of these values through

¹⁹⁴ Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value (London: Macmillan and Co., 1912), p. 317.

¹⁹⁵ A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy (2nd ed. rev.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1920), p. 243.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 236.

¹⁹⁷ W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (Cambridge: University Press, 1918), p. 465.

correct choices between good and evil.

Another important influence on American ontological theory was the work of Nicolai Hartmann in Germany. According to him the values have an ideal being in themselves and contain their own power, structure, and contents. However, man cannot grasp them through thought; "rather are they immediately discerned only by an inner 'vision,' like Plato's 'Ideas.'"¹⁹⁸ They are apprehended intuitively and emotionally.

An American personalist, Edgar S. Brightman, began his theory of values with a criticism of the "Neo-Realistic Theories of Values" in 1922.¹⁹⁹ While more constructive in his volume on ethics, he left the source of values open by stating that ideal values are either "found among or must grow out of the empirical values. Even if they come from heaven, they drop upon the place beneath."²⁰⁰ The apprehension of value cannot come through the subconscious or emotions, though. He emphatically states:

One fact remains the same whatever be the ultimate origin and interpretation of our value-experience, namely, that the realization of value, its actual functioning in experience occurs in the consciousness of individuals.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁸ Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, Vol. 1: Moral Phenomena (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950), p. 185.

¹⁹⁹ Brightman, op. cit.

²⁰⁰ Edgar S. Brightman, Moral Laws (New York: The Abingdon Press, 1933), p. 129.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p. 207.

A slight modification of this theory appeared in his later work where he affirmed that "nature and values are one world, a world which can be realized effectively only by the labors of reason and love, human and divine."²⁰² The source of values is rooted in the same source as nature, and together they form a union, the experience of which is open to both reason and emotion.

B. The Immanently Real Source of Values

A new metaphysical theory of value was introduced by Alfred North Whitehead, who defined value as "the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event."²⁰³ Values never occur in isolation, but are attained through the process of self realization, which depends upon certain limitations. "God," for him, "is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality No reason can be given for the nature of God, because the Nature is the ground of rationality."²⁰⁴ Values occur only where there are antecedent standards of value and limiting conditions of realization. There are always two factors, pattern and feeling, "in our realization of experience, either as immediate value or as stimulus to activity for

²⁰² Edgar S. Brightman, Nature and Values (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945), p. 166.

²⁰³ Alfred N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925), p. 136.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 257.

for further value.²⁰⁵ Existence is the acquisition of pattern by feeling. This equation of value with intrinsic reality by-passes the subject-object dichotomy. It is not something the subject nor the object has, gives or receives, but is that which is, and which is realized within each moment of existence. Certain aspects of this theory are elaborated in the Adventure of Ideas.²⁰⁶

Henry Nelson Wieman based his theory of value on Whitehead's philosophy. His definition is that "value is something which is found in the concrete individual in so far as he is capable of actualizing possibilities."²⁰⁷ This accounts for the varieties of realized values. The whole universe is in the process of realizing individuality and concreteness. God, being the "Principle of Concretion," is the ultimate source of value possibilities. The limits of actualization of each individual, and the universe, as it becomes more concrete, are established by the principle of organization. According to Wieman, "the value inherent in the universe depends on how many diverse possibilities can be actualized without changing the basic principle of organization."²⁰⁸

In his volume entitled, The Source of Human Good, he describes this actual-

²⁰⁵ Alfred N. Whitehead, "Mathematics and the Good," in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, edited by Paul A. Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1941), p. 678.

²⁰⁶ Alfred N. Whitehead, Adventure of Ideas (New York: Macmillan, 1933).

²⁰⁷ H. N. Wieman, "Value and the Individual," Journal of Philosophy, XXV, No. 9 (April 26, 1928), 235.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 238.

ization as the creative event, which is made up of four sub-events working together. These are:

The emerging awareness of qualitative meaning derived from other persons through communication; integrating these new meanings with others previously acquired; expanding the richness of quality in the appreciable world by enlarging its meaning; deepening the community among those who participate in this total creative event of intercommunication.²⁰⁹

Values are apprehended through, as well as dependent upon, personal and inter-personal communication of meanings.

The actualization of internal possibilities, as the source of values, has been projected also by Kurt Goldstein. For him, the drive toward the achievement of "self-actualization" is responsible for the problem of value. He defines

the organism as a Being enduring in time, or if we may say so, in eternal time; for it does not commence with procreation, certainly not with birth, and does not end with death. What we mean by the terms 'birth' and 'death' are merely certain landmarks like others, e.g. like puberty and menopause.²¹⁰

He defines value as a characteristic of the true being of man, the source of which is the "intrinsic potentiality of man's nature to acquire such a state of adequacy."²¹¹ Values manifest themselves in two ways: functionally significant in being "essential to the nature of the organism . . . (and) paramount in the

²⁰⁹ H. N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 58.

²¹⁰ Kurt Goldstein, The Organism (New York: American Book Co., 1939), p. 510.

²¹¹ Kurt Goldstein, "Health as Value," in New Knowledge in Human Values (New York: Harper & Bros., 1959), p. 187.

the preservation of its life."²¹²

According to this theory the apprehension of value occurs on three levels. The abstract level he calls "Bewusst haben . . . having something consciously."²¹³ The concrete feeling level is "Erleben . . . inner experience,"²¹⁴ and the non-conscious level occurs in the involuntary bodily processes. This expands the usual meaning of apprehension, but is essential in understanding the "holistic" approach to values. The teaching of value is the sharing of insight into the potential of the respective individual. Methods vary, but for Goldstein "self-actualization" is important enough to resort to repetitious drill if necessary.

C. Existential Experience as the Source of Value

The value theory presented by Werner Wolff distinguishes two meanings of experience: "Erfahrung is an addition of an object to knowledge, (and) Erlebnis an integration and fusion between the object and the person."²¹⁵ The latter is the experience of value and occurs only in what he calls a three-dimensional manner. A sign stimulates a definite one-dimensional experience. A symbol evokes an associative chain response, or two-dimensional experience. The three-dimensional experience is when the outer stimulus fuses with the inner ideal image and "reality

²¹² Goldstein, The Organism, p. 35.

²¹³ Ibid., p. 311

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Werner Wolff, Values and Personality (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1950), p. 33.

is transformed into value.²¹⁶ He notes further that when man experiences values, then signs and symbols receive a universal significance. Values are apprehended in the existential demand for decision when the "data" of the objective world is transformed into a personal problem.

Eliseo Vivas believes that "values have the same nature and status as universals."²¹⁷ They form part of the structure making spatio-temporal existence possible. Like the other laws, or conditions, of existence they are uncreated, but can be discovered in the encounter between the subject and his world. Their apprehension involves the feelings and impulses, even though he admits:

Intellectual activity is effective in practice in a complex and round-about, indirect way; but it cannot be a substitute--as Aristotle saw--for growth and development which the moral man undergoes and the second birth which, I have argued, the ethical man achieves.²¹⁸

Value is experienced only by persons in their total involvement with their world. This takes place, for better or for worse, according to universal laws, which reveal values.

According to H. Richard Niebuhr's thesis values are "the good-for-ness of being for being in their reciprocity, their animosity, and their mutual aid."²¹⁹

²¹⁶ Ibid., p. 35.

²¹⁷ Vivas, op. cit., p. 238.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p. 344.

²¹⁹ H. Richard Niebuhr, "The Center of Value," in Moral Principles of Action, edited by Ruth N. Anshen (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), p. 169.

They are not substances, nor qualities, as they have no existence in themselves. Their source is the worth which being has for being. He further affirms that "value is not a relation but arises in the relations of being to being."²²⁰ Everything is valuable, positively or negatively, in its relationship with every other thing; whereas, neither subject nor object possess value in themselves. Values, then, are immanently real within, and only within, the subject-object encounter.

D. Being and Love: The Value Equation

1. Ontology, Theology, and Value Theory

One approach to the study of philosophy is to empirically gather the bare "facts" and rationally search through them for "meanings" and "values." This implies that man can detach himself from the world and arrive at truth by observation and reason. Tillich is convinced that "man is more than an apparatus for registering so-called 'facts' and their independence."²²¹ Man is involved existentially within his world and is concerned ultimately with the question of his relationship with being-itself. Philosophy, for him, begins, not with "the things and events, the ideas and values, the souls and bodies which share being,"²²² but with ontology, "the rational explanation of the structure of being-itself."²²³ As

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 87.

²²² Ibid., p. 85.

²²³ Paul Tillich, "Being and Love," in Moral Principles of Action (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952), p. 661.

pointed out by J. H. Randall, Jr., "these structures, of course . . . include structures of value."²²⁴

For most of his life, Tillich admits, he was "an outspoken critic of the philosophy of values."²²⁵ He attributed this to his dissatisfaction with the philosophy of Herman Lotze and the theological influence of Albrecht Ritschl. They had split value from being in the hope of saving value from annihilation in the defeat of metaphysics. Values became mere subjective valuations for their followers.

Other philosophers of value reacted against this subjectivism and sought to establish values as a priori and absolute. For these thinkers, the good, the beautiful and the true, "have the character of 'ought-to-be,' but not of 'is.'"²²⁶ The main weakness in this approach is that "values demand to be actualized in existence and through existence."²²⁷ If values come from beyond being how can they be related to existence?

Pragmatism's answer was that these norms were the objectification of human experiences accepted as the most adequate for behavior. This reaction from absoluteness into relativity has no application except in each particular situation.

²²⁴ John H. Randall, Jr., "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, edited by C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 138.

²²⁵ Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?", p. 189.

²²⁶ Paul Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 73.

²²⁷ Ibid., p. 74.

An alternative answer was projected through the theological statement that "ethical norms are given by God."²²⁸ This is, for Tillich, an improvement over the other in that here the moral imperative is unconditionally grounded in the supreme lawgiver. But this absolute lawgiver has the characteristics of a stranger, who demands submission, thus threatening the realization of the very values desired by removing freedom.

Tillich's conclusion of this analysis states:

The whole theory is wrecked by the necessity of distinguishing between relative values, which can be reduced to valuations, and absolute values which require another foundation because they command valuations.²²⁹

He happily finds that ontology can "show the root of value in the structure of being itself,"²³⁰ thus resolving the difficulties. From this he concludes that value theory must be replaced by ontology. This does not seem to be required, provided one can say he is presenting a new theory, an ontological theory of the sources and apprehensions of value. However, this ontological theory is closely related with theology in that "ontology is based on the universal, although fragmentary, process of revelation."²³¹

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 75.

²²⁹ Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?", p. 192.

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 662.

Being-itself reveals itself to man through ecstatic experiences. Some psychological aspects of these were described by Abraham H. Maslow in his presidential address before the American Psychological Association in 1956.²³² His study led to the hypothesis that "fact" and "value" could not be mutually exclusive, as previously believed. The "peak experience" is a "self-validating, self-justifying moment which carries its own intrinsic value with it."²³³ Maslow said:

When we examine the most ego-detached, objective, motivationless, passive cognition, we find that it claims to perceive values directly, that values cannot be shorn away from reality and that the most profound perceptions of 'facts' are tinged with wonder, admiration, awe and approval, i.e., with value.²³⁴

He indicated these experiences were self-transcending. The values seemed to be "out there," coming into awareness "as if they were perceptions of a reality independent of man and persisting beyond his life."²³⁵ The "as if" saves him from having to make a theological affirmation of some "wholly other" source of value.

The peak experience itself does not require a theological explanation according to George Santayana. He described one such personal experience in this way:

As I was jogging to market in my village cart, beauty has burst upon me and the reins have dropped from my hands. I am transported, in a certain measure, into a state of trance. I see with extraordinary clearness, yet what I see seems strange and wonderful, because I no longer look in order to understand, but only in order to see. I have lost my preoccupation with fact, and am contemplating in essence.²³⁶

²³² Abraham H. Maslow, "Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences," *The Journal of Genetic Psychology*, XCIV (1959), 43-46.

²³³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

²³⁶ George Santayana, *The Realm of Essence* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), pp. 6f.

Stephen C. Pepper has argued that Santayana's "essence" and "value" could have the ontological status of "images or sensations in a typical subjectivistic psychology characteristic of the traditional mechanists."²³⁷ While Santayana admitted "that interest, if you identify interest with all passions or valuations, was the source of value,"²³⁸ he, nevertheless, held that the essence of beauty has some form of objectivity in stating: "this divine beauty is evident, fugitive, impalpable, . . . it visits time, but belongs to eternity."²³⁹ One can hardly speak of these peak experiences in philosophical terms without using the language of theology.

Tillich holds that theology is so related to philosophy that neither can discern the whole truth alone. They both deal with being; "philosophy . . . with the structure of being-itself; theology . . . with the meaning of being for us."²⁴⁰ Philosophy, for him, begins in ontology, which seeks to explain the structure of reality. At the same time he is motivated by the ultimate concern for understanding the meaning of existence, which is the theological task.

The human situation is understood theologically as estrangement. Man begins his earthly career in the state of "dreaming innocence." His efforts toward

²³⁷Stephen C. Pepper, "Santayana's Theory of Value," in The Philosophy of George Santayana (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1951), p. 223.

²³⁸Santayana, "Apologia Pro Menta Sua," p. 577.

²³⁹Santayana, The Realm of Essence, p. 154.

²⁴⁰Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951 - 1957), I, 22.

self-actualization simultaneously result in creation and "the Fall." In this way "man is estranged from the ground of his being, from other beings, and from himself."²⁴¹ While the essence of man is present in all stages of development it is

existentially distorted. Finite man is imperfect in that he is limited within existence. However, "God is perfect because he transcends essence and existence."²⁴²

These theological assertions illustrate the ultimate concern for understanding being-itself, not from the point of view of philosophical detachment, but from the experience of involvement and commitment. Theology cannot escape dealing with the structures of being, even though it may relegate these presuppositions.

The problem of values, in the same way, must find ontological foundations for its value-judgments. The structure of being conditions all discussions of reality.

Tillich, therefore, notes:

If values have no fundamentum in re (cf. Plato's identification of the good with the essential structures, the ideas of being), they float in the air of a transcendent validity, or else they are subjected to pragmatic tests which are arbitrary and accidental unless they introduce an ontology of essences surreptitiously.²⁴³

He chooses to demonstrate the source of values in being-itself, revealed through its ontological structures, and apprehended in the tensions of self-actualizing existence.

²⁴¹ Ibid., II, 44.

²⁴² Ibid., II, 34.

²⁴³ Ibid., I, 20.

2. Being-Itself the Ground of Values

The foregoing discussion implies that one of Tillich's favorite concepts, the "boundary," dealt with at length in The Interpretation of History,²⁴⁴ can be used to categorize his value theory. Even though he seeks to place the study of values within ontology, or first philosophy, he cannot remove values from theological relationships. As he had noted earlier, his "philosophy of religion abides consciously on the border of theology and philosophy."²⁴⁵ In his later writings he likewise affirms:

The true and the good (verum, bonum), usually combined with being and oneness (esse, unum), do not belong to pure ontology, because they are meaningful only in relation to a judging subject. Their ontological foundation, however, is discussed in connection with the duality of essence and existence.²⁴⁶

In any meaningful discussion he finds it necessary to deal with theological implications and possible answers to the philosophical questions. When faced with the ontological question of the nature of being-itself, he naturally turns to the theological affirmation that "the being of God is being-itself."²⁴⁷ However, this is not the end of the matter, for he moves on to probe the philosophical implications of the definition. The method of approach is to pose the question of how man

²⁴⁴Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), pp. 3-73.

²⁴⁵Ibid., p. 36.

²⁴⁶Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 166.

²⁴⁷Ibid., I, 235.

arrives at the knowledge of God or being-itself. He finds that within the experience of finitude there occurs an element which transcends the finite both theoretically and practically. This unconditional element manifests itself

In the theoretical (receiving) functions of reason as verum ipsum, the true-itself as the norm of all approximations to truth . . . in the practical (shaping) function of reason as bonum ipsum, the good-itself as the norm of all approximations to goodness. Both are manifestation of esse ipsum, being-itself as the ground and abyss of everything that is.²⁴⁸

Understanding comes through the union of the two types of reason, which Kant had separated into the pure, or theoretical reason, and the practical, or empirical reason. Tillich uses the terms ontological, or receiving knowledge, and technical, or controlling knowledge for these two forms of reason. In their union --in understanding--they enter the quest for further revelation. Therefore, reason has its structure, its implicit ontology, in the same way as being-itself. Man is able to know and understand himself and his world, while gaining some insight into the nature of reality, because he participates in its structure. His reason is grasped and shaped by the manifestations of being-itself within his total being.

Tillich, at times, equates being with value; for example, when he states, "If God is called ipsum esse, Being-itself, he can also, and must, be called ipsum verum, the true itself."²⁴⁹ He seems to do this in order to prove that values have ontological foundations and are neither subjective nor objective addenda.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., I, 206ff

²⁴⁹ Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 64.

He follows the Platonic doctrine of levels of being which manifest more or less power of being. This doctrine, he states, "has been challenged by neo-Kantianism because it seems to confuse being and value."²⁵⁰ He feels that confusion is more desirable than the removal of value and meaning from participation in the power of being-itself.

In his later writings he refers to truth, goodness, and beauty as symbolic attributes, which participate in, but cannot be literally equated with God. This rethinking became necessary in order to keep these symbols from being taken as the equivalent of being-itself, which is mysteriously hidden from the finite mind. In this regard he was impressed with Albert Einstein's conviction that the profoundest depths of reason were inaccessible to man, and therefore the idea of a Personal God was scientifically untenable.²⁵¹ He interpreted Einstein's idea as pointing toward:

A common ground of the whole of the physical world and of supra-personal values; a ground which, on the one hand, is manifest in the structure of being (the physical world) and meaning (the good, true, and beautiful), and which, on the other hand, is hidden in its inexhaustible depth.²⁵²

²⁵⁰
Ibid., p. 68.

²⁵¹
Albert E. Einstein, "Science, Philosophy, and Religion," paper delivered in New York City, September 1940, quoted in Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 127ff.

²⁵²
Tillich, Ibid., p. 130.

Einstein's concept of the supra-personal is one symbol for understanding being-itself as more than personal. The symbol of the Personal God is, nevertheless, necessary for human communication, as this is our most complete category. But to take it as the object of worship is idolatry, according to Tillich. A person exists, but "God does not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence."²⁵³

Value, like the structure of being, is manifest within existence; whereas, being-itself is "the essential structure of being, the essence of all essences, which is called God."²⁵⁴ Our apprehension of essence comes in the existential shock of the possibility of not being. The negative shock of the "abyss" of non-being is accompanied by the affirmative revelation of the "ground" of being in the experience of "ultimate concern." According to Tillich, "it is the triumph of the dynamics of faith that any denial of faith is itself an expression of faith, of an ultimate concern."²⁵⁵

Every experience is grounded in being-itself, and nothing exists except in polar relationship to its essence. Value is manifest when "essence empowers and judges that which exists."²⁵⁶ Language seems a bit ambiguous when Tillich will not allow "essence" to be equated with reality. Rather he keeps affirming that

²⁵³ Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 205.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., I, 233.

²⁵⁵ Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 127.

²⁵⁶ Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 203.

being-itself transcends both essence and existence, infinity and finitude. He argues that "otherwise it would be conditioned by something other than itself, and the real power of being would lie beyond both it and that which conditioned it."²⁵⁷ Part of the ambiguity is attributed to the double meaning of both essence and existence. Essence may be defined as either:

A logical ideal to be reached by abstraction or intuition without the interference of valuations, . . . (or) that from which being has 'fallen,' the true and undistorted nature of things.²⁵⁸

These definitions flow from "the ambiguous character of existence, which expresses being and at the same time contradicts it."²⁵⁹

The question can be asked whether Tillich has now prepared the way for identifying value with essence rather than with being-itself. If he were forced to choose between the two definitions of essence, referred to above, he would very likely lean toward the concept of value involvement over logical abstraction. However he believes they can both be affirmed without logical contradiction. He does this through viewing essence as accounting for reality and appearance. He states:

Essence as that which makes a thing what it is (ousia) has a purely logical character; essence as that which appears in an imperfect and distorted way in a thing carries the stamp of value.²⁶⁰

The relationship of being-itself to both essence and existence is illustrated where "Plato uses the word parousia for the presence of the essences in temporal

²⁵⁷ Ibid., I, 237.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., I, 203.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

existence.²⁶¹ The meaning of "par-ousia" is that essence participates through "being-by," or "being-with," but not in the sense of space and time. For this reason the relationship must be discussed symbolically, not literally. "God participates in everything that is,"²⁶² but He is not spatially present either here or there. The dimension of reality of being-itself does not destroy the "here and now," but catches each moment up into the "eternal now," which gives each spatio-temporal experience its structure, meaning and value. Value in this context could be the "essential nature," of each existent, its norm and the power of being, through which it is judged and empowered to actualize itself.

3. The Actualization of Value

In looking for evidence of the "ought-to-be" within the "is" of encountered reality, Tillich combines an ideating element, "the intuition of the essence within some existing exemplars,"²⁶³ with empirical analysis. The latter alone cannot give the image of the perfect tree, for example, and the former would be merely an imaginary abstraction. The essential structures of perfect beings appear within experience in a state of distortion, yet man, in some way, becomes aware of the "eidos or essence of treehood--which is more than concept."²⁶⁴ The questions as to from where and how man grasps, or is grasped by this "eidos" is the problem of the

²⁶¹ Ibid., I, 245.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?", p. 193.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

source and apprehension of value in his theory.

Tillich has not dealt at length with the valuing process of natural objects and events. His primary concern has been man, his nature, his history, and his relation to being-itself. The human being is "the place where special values receive their ontological foundations."²⁶⁵ While he would not limit value to this level of existence he does believe that man is the valuing subject, who seeks for meaning within his history. From this perspective he can affirm: "Value is man's essential being, put as an imperative against him."²⁶⁶ Therefore, to discover man's essential being is to discover value.

The search begins in an analysis of man's existential, or distorted, condition of estrangement. The dominant characteristic of man seems to be his drive toward self-actualization. Tillich assumes a state of "dreaming innocence" prior to the experience of creation and "the Fall," of which Adam is the symbol. This is not to be equated with perfection; it is neutral, a state of potential. He insists, "mere potentiality or dreaming innocence is not perfection. Only the conscious union of existence and essence is perfection."²⁶⁷ The fall comes about through decision and self-actualization, when one's desires are thwarted by some prohibition. As illustrated in the temptation of Adam in the Old Testament, "the desire in itself is not bad (the fruit is good to eat); but the conditions of its lawful fulfillment are

²⁶⁵
Ibid., p. 194.

²⁶⁶
Ibid., p. 195.

²⁶⁷
Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, 34.

not kept, and so the act of eating becomes an act of concupiscence (lust for power).²⁶⁸ On the other hand in the temptations of Jesus in the New Testament narrative, the lust for power is overcome by the self-transcending desire for union with God.

In the search for the difference between the "New Being" realized in Jesus as the Christ and the common lot of mankind, which experiences the "fall" into distorted existence, Tillich looks into the findings of depth psychology. At this level he believes "we encounter the past, the ancestors, the collective unconscious, the living substance in which all living beings participate."²⁶⁹ These subconscious elements are known as they "break through" into consciousness. Experience has demonstrated two characteristic states of these elements--the "demonic," and the "state of grace." Each is capable of breaking into consciousness in ecstasy, overpowering the center of the personality, and either destroying the form of the unified self or recreating it. The observed difference being that "grace has a fulfilling and form-creating effect on the bearer of form, while demonry has the consequence of destroying the personality through robbing it of being and emptying it of meaning."²⁷⁰

²⁶⁸ Ibid., II, 128.

²⁶⁹ Paul Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 13.

²⁷⁰ Tillich, The Interpretation of History, p. 88.

But man is more than a center of self-consciousness at the mercy of overwhelming subconscious forces. He is a participant within his natural and cultural environment. He is not wholly determined by either one or a combination of factors. His freedom to respond and decide is finite, but his power of self-actualization carries with it the responsibility for fulfilling his destiny. As David Roberts has observed in Tillich's thought:

Decisions issue from a self which has been formed by nature and history; the self includes bodily structure, psychic strivings, moral and spiritual character, communal relations, past experiences (both remembered and forgotten), and the total impact of the environment.²⁷¹

These factors combine to give the person his destiny, not his "fate," but destiny is held in polar tension with freedom. Tillich is concerned that man be viewed as a unified whole, with the spirit serving to link the body and the mind. He believes "the success of this union determines the integration (or disintegration) of the personality."²⁷² All psychological functions are total functions in that no specialized bodily organ accounts for them. When a person is afraid, concerned, or in love this is total involvement. In man one cannot allude to the merely biological or merely spiritual, for "every cell of his body participates in his freedom and spirituality, and every act of his spiritual creativity is nourished

²⁷¹David E. Roberts, "Tillich's Doctrine of Man," The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 118.

²⁷²Paul Tillich, "The Relation of Religion and Health," in Religion and Health, A Symposium, edited by Simon Doniger (New York: Association Press, 1958), p. 30.

by his vital dynamics.²⁷³

The conflict within man and the estrangement between men, nature, and the ground of being is accepted by Tillich as universal and unavoidable. In every effort toward self-actualization, individually and collectively, man is threatened by the possibility of non-being. This results in existential anxiety, which has the three forms:

That of fate and death (briefly, the anxiety of death), that of emptiness and loss of meaning (briefly, the anxiety of meaninglessness), that of guilt and condemnation (briefly, the anxiety of condemnation).²⁷⁴

Man is anxious about the loss of life biologically, the loss of meaning mentally, and the loss of his relationship to the ground of his being spiritually. The theological answer to anxiety is the "courage to be," the courage "to accept oneself as accepted in spite of being unacceptable."²⁷⁵ Even in the severe anxiety of doubting the reality of the God of contemporary personalism, Tillich sees an act "of courage in which we affirm the power of being, whether we know it or not."²⁷⁶ This is true because the power of being-itself grasps man even in the experience of the abyss of non-being. Being-itself is the source of the radical doubt, the divine yes in tension with the divine no, which makes God a living God. The greater the threat of non-being, the greater the "grace" to overcome it, and the gifts of faith and courage to face it. In other words being-itself gives man the power to take the radical doubt into his own self-actualization.

²⁷³ Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 83.

²⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 41.

²⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 164.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 181.

Looking into the abyss of non-being and accepting this as just as essential in man's life as it is for God is the deepest experience of actualizing value. No doubt most persons escape the depths of this anxiety, and experience varying degrees of actualization without radical, existential shock.

The "New Being" is the norm of full self-actualization, and therefore for the actualization of value. This "New Being" is manifest in Christ because in Him the separation never overcame the unity between Him and God, between Him and mankind, between Him and Himself.²⁷⁷ For Tillich, the nature of the New Being, as of Being-Itself is "Love." The manifestation of value within the universe is therefore through love.

4. Being-Itself Manifest Through Love

If the "particular" theory of value can be seen in the norm of the New Being actualized in persons, the "generalization" of the ontological theory can be seen in the various forms and expressions of love in the created order. Tillich holds that the definition of love "is impossible because there is no higher principle by which it could be defined."²⁷⁸ Love overcomes the contradiction between absolute and relative values in that it maintains an eternal unchangeable element, which adapts itself to continuous creative acts at each "kairos, the 'right time,'

²⁷⁷ Paul Tillich, The New Being (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 22.

²⁷⁸ Tillich, The Protestant Era, p. 160.

. . . the historical moment in which something new, eternally important, manifests itself in temporal forms. ²⁷⁹

Love is equated with being-itself, as the power of life in all its forms. It is being-itself as it actualizes itself through creation, estrangement, and reunion. The most difficult problem in value theory is the relationship between justice, power, and love. In Aristotelian ethics justice was proportional, with everyone getting what he deserved according to his deed. In Hebrew thought it was based on God's fulfillment of His promises, and on the human level in terms of "an eye for an eye." In the New Testament the elements of forgiveness and justification, by grace through faith, changed the norm from retribution to the "reunion of the estranged." ²⁸⁰ But this is not to be construed as an emotional disregard for justice and estrangement. Rather the incarnation demonstrates that "love, power, and justice are united in God and they are united in the new creation of God in the world." ²⁸¹ The message of the New Testament holds out the hope for man that he is not cut off from the ground of his being; that love is at work in him seeking to effect reunion through reconciliation and the power of renewal.

"Love is not weakness, nor resignation of power but the perfect power of being," ²⁸² overcoming the threat of separation and non-being. The form it

²⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 155. ²⁸⁰ Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 144.

²⁸¹ Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 115.

²⁸² Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 664.

assumes is justice. Under the limits of finitude both power and justice may be only partially realized. Power is the dynamics of love and justice is its form. The experience of ecstasy or bliss, and its "awareness as fulfillment of life is the emotional nature of love."²⁸³

The manifestation of love is seen not only in its ability to reconcile justice with the power of being, but in the fact that the various forms of love can be understood in their intimate relationships. Tillich notes that love has often been expressed as unrelated opposites; namely, eros and agape. However, the ontology of love "must be able to give a uniting ground to the different forms of what is called love."²⁸⁴ There are actually four types of love distinguished as follows:

The libido type, culminating in sex; the eros type, culminating in mystical union; the philia type, culminating in friendship; the agape type, culminating in caritas.²⁸⁵

These have in common, first of all, the nature of ecstasy. The moment of love culminates in self-transcendence in the sense of the union with the other elements or persons without the loss of self. A second common characteristic is that "love in all its forms is the drive towards the reunion of the separated."²⁸⁶ Reunion implying a former union in being-itself.

²⁸³ Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1, 279f.

²⁸⁴ Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 661.

²⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 666.

²⁸⁶ Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, p. 28.

The Latin word, "libido," from the Greek "epithymia," or desire, is illustrated by the urge toward union with food, drink, and other elements or persons for self-gratification. "Eros" includes desire, but transcends it toward "union with that which is the bearer of the values it embodies."²⁸⁷ If Dionysos represents "libido," then Apollo unites with him in "eros." Beauty is the servant in the first type, but love of beauty for its own sake characterizes the second.

In the third type desire and mystical union are both present but transcended. "Philia" is the union of person with person as equals to form "the community which becomes an independent reality."²⁸⁸ These three forms of love have in common the factor of dependence upon reciprocal relationships. That which is loved is expected to give itself in some way to the lover.

"Agape" adds a new dimension to the understanding of love. In a sense it "enters from another dimension into the whole of life and into all qualities of love."²⁸⁹ This is not to imply that "agape" is unrelated to the others, for the first "three types of love contribute to the symbolization of the divine love."²⁹⁰ In "agape" unconditional and universal elements transcend the finite and particular without destroying them. It is the fulfillment of the other in accord with the

²⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 30.

²⁸⁸ Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 666.

²⁸⁹ Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, p. 33.

²⁹⁰ Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 281.

essential image God has for him. Agape, being the form of love attributed to God in the Johannine writings, implies that where it is manifest then being-itself is revealed most clearly. It is therefore appropriate for the New Testament to use this term for man's love toward his fellowman and toward God Himself in a derived fashion. This is necessarily a partial manifestation, since man is finite, but it does imply that man participates in being-itself. To the extent he is able to actualize his essence within existence he realizes value.

5. The Apprehension of Values

Having studied the "ground," the actualization, and the manifestation of value certain questions arise concerning its identification and apprehension. Is value something which can be detached from its environment and transmitted to another situation in place and time? Can value be identified with either essence, existence, or being-itself? Is value the imagined "eidos," or image of the perfect, though non-existent, being? If value is actualized and manifest through experience why does it seem so intangible?

According to Tillich value could never be detached from its roots in the ground of being-itself. This relationship it shares with everything which shares in being. There is the tendency, as noted in The Protestant Era, to equate value with being. From an analysis of the later writings where he states, "God as Being-Itself is love,"²⁹¹ the question can be posed of the relationship of love and value.

²⁹¹ Tillich, "Being and Love," p. 662.

A possible clue is his substitution of ontology for value theory. Since ontology is the study of the structure of being-itself, then value theory could be the study of value as the structure of being-itself. The apprehension of value would then be conscious participation in the structure of being.

In the discussion of the basic ontological structure he affirms that "every being participates in the structure of being, but man alone is immediately aware of this structure."²⁹² Man is not only aware of the elements of this structure, "he lives in them and acts through them They are he himself."²⁹³ The basic structure is revealed to man as the interdependence of the self and the world. Its basic elements are three pairs of polarities: "individuality and universality, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny."²⁹⁴ The first pair expresses self-relatedness, the second pair expresses belongingness, and the third pair expresses the "power of being to exist and the difference between essential and existential being."²⁹⁵ It is in the discussion of essence and existence that he deals with the ontological foundations of values, and their actualization within existence. The manifestation of being through love is discussed as individuation-participation, and dynamics-form.

Recalling Tillich's definition of ethical value as "man's essential being, put as an imperative against him,"²⁹⁶ one could infer that his "essence" alone

²⁹² Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 168.

²⁹³ Ibid., I, 169

²⁹⁴ Ibid., I, 165.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

²⁹⁶ Tillich, "Is A Science of Human Values Possible?", p. 195.

is not the value, but becomes value when put as a command. This would help explain the statement that the true and the good cannot be studied in "pure" ontology, but have some relation to a subject. One condition for value then is man in the state of estrangement. For "if man were united with himself and his essential being there would be no command."²⁹⁷ Therefore "essence" alone cannot account for value, but essence in polar tension with existence under the conditions of finitude. Finitude is to be understood as the condition where the power of being-itself, limited by the threat of non-being and the freedom granted its creation, can only partially actualize its potential.

In the words of John Herman Randall, Jr., the relationship of essence to existence can be put in perspective as follows:

Historically, the contrast between 'essence' and 'existence' has been both the colorless contrast between idea and fact, and the contrast of value between the ideal and the actual. For Tillich's theology, it is the contrast between the world as created, and the actual world after the Fall.²⁹⁸

Tillich observes that "whenever the ideal is held against the real, truth against error, good against evil, a distortion of essential being is presupposed and is judged by essential being."²⁹⁹ The question then becomes -- what is the source of the ideal, the true, and the good which man contrasts with their negation? Tillich replies, "values must be derived from the essential structures of being

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Randall, op. cit., p. 157.

²⁹⁹ Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, 202.

which appear within existence, though in a state of distortion."³⁰⁰ They have the same validity, but no more authenticity than the structures of being. If the structures change, and historically they may, the values will change.

The apprehension of value "occurs in two complementary ways, the intuitive and the experiential."³⁰¹ Through intuition man becomes aware of the contrast between his essential nature and its actual existence in a state of distortion. Intuition alone is not sufficient. Even the "voice of conscience" is subject to error, and can be corrected only through the continuous criticism of "the experiences of mankind as they are embodied in ethical traditions."³⁰² These traditions must not be taken as absolute external criteria. The real criterion is the internal "tension between the intuitive and the experiential element in the cognition of values."³⁰³

Dorothy M. Emmet has expressed the desire that Tillich relate more closely the ontological reason, which includes both the intuitive and the experiential ways of value apprehension, with technical reason, which seeks to deal experimentally with factual knowledge. She calls for "a way of empirical knowledge which will be (in a broad sense) genuinely scientific, and yet which may from time to time be lighted up by the 'ecstatic' reason."³⁰⁴ This would, doubtless,

³⁰⁰ Tillich, "Is a Science of Human Values Possible?", p. 193.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 195.

³⁰² Ibid., p. 196.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Dorothy M. Emmet, "Epistemology and the Idea of Revelation," The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 213.

make Tillich's doctrine of the "New Being" more palatable for this scientifically oriented generation. Revelatory knowledge is quite subjective, even though allowance is made for "sign events" and ethical traditions. Tillich's reply has a bearing on the apprehension of values as well as of facts. He states:

I call subjective reason all meaningful functions of the human mind, for example, the ethical and aesthetic as well as the cognitive, . . . because they create meaningful expressions of the ground of being Theology only presupposes that meaning is rooted in reality itself that the world can be shaped according to the demands of practical and aesthetic reason, because the really real is at the same time the foundation of value.³⁰⁵

In the structure of being, where values and the facts are actualized and apprehended, the object is held in polar tension with the subject. Whatever intuitive knowledge, experiential-critical knowledge, or experimental-controlling knowledge the subject receives of itself, its object-world, and their interrelations is limited by the conditions of finitude. The resulting partial understanding yields the "quest for revelation," and the opening of the self for an ecstatic experience at the right time -- the kairos.

³⁰⁵ Paul Tillich, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1961), p. 333.

V. CONCLUSION

A. The "Is" and the "Ought-to-Be" within the University

American higher education has taken pride in its objectivity. By and large it has managed to departmentalize its various endeavors by the delegation of functions. To some extent this is illustrated in the three primary value theorists in the present study. Pitirim A. Sorokin has invested his talents in sociological research and analysis. Ralph Barton Perry, while working in philosophy, seemed primarily interested in the physiological and psychological bases of experience and behavior. Paul Tillich has been concerned with theology, but from a philosophical stance. There is hope for a "universe of discourse" in the fact that men of diverse backgrounds and interests can have enough in common to apply themselves to a central problem like values.

From this study certain implications can be drawn to illustrate the possibility of a common search for the answers to the problems of value within the university. Two distinct methods of approach have been presented, and one of these can be subdivided according to content studied. Perry and Sorokin have used the empirical method; Perry concerned with the intra-personal data primarily, and Sorokin with the inter-personal. Tillich has demonstrated an existential method, being concerned with experiential rather than empirical knowledge of values. However, they have had in common a concern for the understanding of the person and his

realization of value .

They can be compared with reference to their views on the structure of knowledge and value. Perry sought to keep his theory of knowledge separate from his theory of value, whereas Sorokin and Tillich united them. In this way Perry could attempt to show value as related only to the "subject." Sorokin held to the "subject-object" structure, and Tillich expanded this into the "subject-object-Ground of Being" relationship. Since they held the "subject" in common, it is well to begin here with the implications for discovering the relations between facts, meanings, and values in higher education.

Perry's theory is so subjective it opens the way for anarchy in campus values; nevertheless, it has the greatest appeal for the physical, biological, and psychological disciplines of study. As a "motor-affective" theory, with the emphasis on "motor," it does not demand any radical shifting of gears for the science and engineering students to be able to communicate with these concepts. This could be the means of entering into discussion of man and his relationships to his machines.

The scientific minds on the campus take pride in objectively studying facts as they "are." They become skeptical of the "ought-to-be," except in terms of a more effective instrument for discovering what "is." Not only is the university departmentalized and specialized for effective analysis and problem solving, but each person reflects this in his own "life-style." Sorokin has emphasized that the individual is the microcosm of his culture. The facts of experience are often kept separate from influencing any modifications in personal behavior, even when the welfare of the person may be at stake. The difference between "motor-affective"

desires and controlled responses grounded in reflection leaves much to be desired in Perry's theory.

For this lack Perry introduced "rationality" as the arbiter of interests, but he had no real way of integrating reason with the neuro-physiological processes. However, "controlling reason," as Tillich called it, is the court of final appeal on many campuses. If a thing, or action, is unreasonable, or non-rational, then it is to be dismissed. This is done theoretically, but for all practical purposes student behavior is still under the influence of irrational forces. In this sense Perry may have been more observant of the well springs of human behavior than we want to admit.

Reason, being theoretically approved as giving meaning to life, could be the approach for Sorokin's contribution to the value situation. His study of the major cultures of the world, and Western culture in particular, can serve as the factual analysis of man's social situation. He has noted in his recent works that the problem now is to get men aware of the facts and motivated to do something about them. The reasonable approach is to realize that "sensate" values are leading to destruction, and that "altruism" is the need of the hour.

The view is often expressed by college personnel that they are working for slave wages. However, it would be interesting to know how many of them would teach for the love of teaching, or for the sake of the students, if they were promised freedom to do so on a subsistence allowance. I think we do not have to look at ancient Rome to get a picture of a sensate, materialistic culture. Yet, how many persons are convinced by Sorokin's analysis of the facts and their meaning

to be either inspired, or scared, into changing their values? This is not to imply that his findings are irrelevant to our situation, but only to face the facts with him, and with Philip E. Jacob's study, that a relatively small percentage of persons are changed once they leave the influence of their parents and their early peer groups. The implication is that persons within the university community, individually and collectively, must be confronted with these facts and their interpretation in the hope some may change.

Empirical data seems to need something deeper to relate it to motivation and personal transformation. The object set over against the subject, even if it be an inspiring ideal like "altruism," has little apparent influence. Perry's internalized "object of interest" has no more motivational force than the innate or acquired "governing propensity" allows it. In view of what we know today about motivation, Perry's four methods of arousing interest seem quite naive. The presentation of the object, a teacher's personal interest in it, and the threat of removing the object are all unlikely enough. However, the fourth way of so satisfying all other interests that the "pearl of great price" remains without competition would be a virtual impossibility on most campuses.

Sorokin's method of producing "love" in such quantities that it would permeate the culture may hold out a little more hope. Especially if he would allow Tillich's linkage between "libido-eros-philia-agape." He seems to think, however, that "philia" with a dash of "agape" is the formula for altruism, and that "eros" is its opposite. There is some evidence that lower levels of love are being realized on the campuses, but to find many persons willing to work at producing

equality and unselfishness could be difficult indeed. The implication is that even beginning on a small scale, true interpersonal relationships, where one loves his neighbor as he does himself, could make a decided difference in the community.

If Sorokin's study of good neighbors is an indication of how persons become altruistic, then the next best source of influence, after the student leaves his immediate family, is religion. Does this mean that the university should provide for more religious expression, or at least cease to sneer at its efforts? Of course, altruism may not be a goal of the university, in which case, assuming Sorokin has correctly diagnosed and prescribed for the culture, the university may have to rethink its purposes.

Practically all the value theories studied have realized that values must become personal commitments to be effective. Many sources, both ultimate and intermediate, have been projected, yet almost without exception they call for their internalization and self-actualization. If they are objective ideals, then the person must identify with them. If they are subjective interests or innate tendencies, then conditions must be provided for their coming to awareness and realization within existence. Therefore, the personal dimension cannot be overlooked within the university. In American mass education the individual is more nearly an IBM digit, or punched hole, than a person such as described in many of the theories. The implication is that, if values are to be actualized on the campus, the university must find some way to become person-centered in its educational task.

The other side of the problem is that of objective standards. The extreme danger here is an undergirding of conformity, and as Jacob's study pointed out

this is a major characteristic of the present generation of students. The conformity observed is not necessarily related to the "best possible" standards of behavior, however. Just because everyone is "doing it" does not mean that it is right. The problem is to determine what is best, and what criterion is to be used in evaluation. Perry subscribed to the "conflict of interests" theory with rationality as the referee. This may be, more or less, the "state of being" on the campus, but very few agree that this is an adequate norm. Sorokin suggests using empirical data from the past relative to the realization of integrally oriented cultures. The fact that he did not find a culture, which had withstood external threat and internal disintegration, leaves something to be desired in his norm. Tillich does not believe that absolute, external criteria can be found. Rather he appeals for the acceptance of internal tensions as the way life "is," and accounts for tension in terms of "essential being" both empowering and judging "existential" self-actualization. The cultural situation does not determine the personal "fallen state," but rather shares with it the partial actualization of "essence" within "existence." The norm for persons is the "New Being," in whom the desire for union with "Being-Itself" overcomes the temptations of the lust for power. Within a status-seeking, power-grabbing society it may take the existential shock of "non-being" to affect appreciably the status quo.

All three of the theories studied in depth have veered away from absolute standards of value. Perry finds value relative to interests, Sorokin to cultural focus, and Tillich to the structure of being-itself as revealed within the conditions of finitude. Those theories appealing for absoluteness conceded their actualization

dependent on the relativities of the situation. This implies that values will be found within the contemporary situation and not in some absolute, unrelated realm of reality. Perry's "interests," Sorokin's "philosophical conception," and Tillich's "ultimate concern" indicate the human element in the determination of what is actually deemed important. There is some validity in the empirical questionnaires and interviews for discovering the stated preferences and objectives of the university and its personnel.

The relationship of experiential-critical knowledge to empirical knowledge may offer some guidelines for the apprehension of values in an intellectual atmosphere. Tillich does not believe they can be received through "technical" reason, which is that employed primarily in the university. Neither does he believe the experiential element is sufficient without intuition. Sorokin, however, adheres more closely to a basic confidence in "technical" reason, supplemented by intuitive "flashes of insight." He may be closer to Tillich's critical reason, however, than it first appears in his analysis of cultural traditions. The depth dimension is lacking in Sorokin in terms of existential commitment and involvement in the historical process. He seems to view culture as a spectator, or a physician diagnosing a patient. Perry's "rationality" is an addendum to the "motor-affective" desires and does not offer any real solution of the rational apprehension of values.

If Tillich's assumption, that no one can exist outside of the grasp of being-itself, can be accepted, then the implication is that the task of value apprehension is to help even the radical doubters realize they are accepted, and worthy of self-actualization of their full potential. Value would, therefore, be actualized

and apprehended as each person confronts and responds to his "essential being." The role of "technical" reason could be to alert persons to the possibility of understanding their existence within the polar structure of being-itself.

B. Implications for a Comprehensive Theory of Value

The "General Theory," the "Integral Theory," and "Ontology" have all aimed at comprehension. Whether they have fully achieved their expectations is something which each critic must judge for himself. Their thoughtful work, together with the contributions of the other theorists, are suggestive of the essential elements in value theory.

In one sense the history of these studies reveals a progressive inclusiveness, and synthesis of past contributions. This can be illustrated where the neuro-psychological emphasis of Perry was supplemented by the sociological emphasis of Sorokin. Tillich has not discounted the importance of these, but has gone beyond to ground both the personal and interpersonal in being-itself. One might ask if this is as inclusive as value theory can hope to become, and if now its task is the analysis of the elements within the ontological structure. There are those who think that Tillich has stretched the categories too far already. It is doubtful the finite mind could conceive of a dimension of reality beyond "being-itself," and, if such a symbol was found, Tillich would possibly say it is merely another term for what he meant.

The implications for further theorizing and testing of value hypotheses are not in the area of encompassing more territory, but in finding coherence and order

within the diversity of suggestions. For example, the relationship between a "science of valuations," those preferences and choices which are actually made, and the "theory of value," dealing only with the "ought-to-be."

The argument, whether there can be knowledge of values similar to knowledge of facts, could well hinge on whether the definition was narrow or broad. Several theories have suggested that values are like laws of nature, both immanent within reality, and capable of being conceived abstractly. Even Tillich's concern with the "structure of being" indicates this analogy. This allows for values in the sense of what is actually experienced, as well as the value-judgments of what ought-to-be.

Assuming the validity of this analogy values are not something that the university is to import from outside its borders, or even less to be desired, something to be relegated to the religious and ethical groups at the edge of the campus. The task of the university becomes that of discovering its own nature within the structure of reality, and seeking a "vision" of what it could become in the actualization of its own "essential being."

In this regard Dorothy Emmet is justified in asking for a further application of Tillich's methodology in seeking greater coherence between the two types of reason which he projects. Both the "experiential-receiving" and the "empirical-controlling" types drive toward understanding, which then becomes the quest for further "revelation," Tillich may seem too theological in this emphasis on revelation, but the ecstatic experience is not uncommon within the university community. If some prefer to explain it in neuro-psychological terms, there should be room in a

comprehensive theory of value for these interpretations.

The degree of "ecstasy" cannot be the determining factor in an experience of value, however. The emotional element cannot be omitted, but it can be recognized as an accompanying manifestation. This does not do violence to either Perry's "motor-affective," or Sorokin's "sensory" and "intuitive" perceptions of values. Rather it places the experience of "ecstasy" in perspective, while allowing for the total experience of value apprehension.

Tillich's analysis of the threats of death, meaninglessness, and condemnation are vital for any comprehensive theory. These types of anxiety are manifest in the university culture in the endless search for security, status, and acceptance as symbols of importance. Students seem to experience a real "break-through" when they realize the challenge of competing for the actualization of their own potential, rather than against some outer standard. Many of them seem to feel obligated to fulfill expectations of parents and peers, which often goes counter to their own inner longings, vocationally and otherwise. This results in anxiety, frustration and the disintegration of their value loyalties. If value is defined as one's "essential being" empowering and judging one's existence, then external pressures can be evaluated by this standard.

There seems to be an obsession within American higher education for external standards of excellence. The entire system of grades, which perhaps does more to promote cheating than any other factor, is justified as a necessary evil within a highly competitive society. The more the masses invade the university, the greater the pressures for conformity to external standards will be required. This will call

for more counseling and guidance services, which must then be supplemented by clinical psychologists and psychiatrists. An adequate theory of values should be able to suggest a way to harmonize the external and internal pressures for the promotion of health.

Tillich's analysis of love is suggestive in this regard. The desires in themselves are not considered evil nor disruptive. Yet, as Perry did not adequately note, they must be transcended. The self is not sufficient to deal with its internal tensions, much less its external threats. However, its relations to the ground of being opens the possibility, not only of acceptance, but of "grace" and power to overcome the "demonic" within the subconscious, and its expression within the environment. Love in all of its forms is the symbol of the power of being-itself to actualize itself through the conditions of finitude. The drive of "libido" toward culmination in the ecstasy of sex, for example, must be understood as basic in life. However, unless it is transcended by "eros," "philia," and "agape," in the concern for the equal fulfillment of the other person's potential, it will lead to degradation and condemnation.

Along this line "religion" should be redefined to include not only the moral and spiritual values, but the permeating power of being-itself actualizing all values. The university community would then be able to appreciate the permeation of values in its total life, rather than be obligated to react without direction, to either the majority or minority group expressions of particular religious convictions. Religion, or values, within the life of the community would be recognized as the manifestations of truth, beauty, goodness, and love in all of their forms.

Commitment to one's "ultimate concern" would be recognized in an atmosphere of freedom held in tension by responsibility to oneself, his neighbor, and his community. In this way values could emerge and be apprehended in any and all types of situations, whether they be curricular, co-curricular, or administrative functions of the university.

The theory of value points to a dimension of reality transcending the spatio-temporal categories of nature and history. The "interest" theories would tend to deny this implication, holding that even the "mind" is merely the body developed to the level of awareness of its own contents. However, as Tillich has pointed out even the logical positivists must deal with thought as more than physiological process. Sorokin appeals to the "supra-sensory" and the "supra-rational," but these terms seem too quantitative in referring to more of the same sensory and rational elements. In the same way the term "everlasting" indicates merely an endless extension of normal time. Tillich is inclined toward a new dimension of reality in his use of the "eternal." His Kairos is the right temporal moment for the simple reason it has been invaded, or broken into, by the eternal. The subconscious, likewise, is not a physiological reservoir, but like Jung's "collective unconscious," transcends space and time. Symbols, concepts, and powers, like the "demonic" and "grace," cannot be clearly conceived as limited to spatio-temporal containers.

When Sorokin seeks for evidence of the production of altruism through "extra-sensory" means, he is approaching this transcendence. Whether or not this can be called "scientific" evidence remains to be more fully tested. It is related to the historical in that it is not repeatable in concrete exactness, which the physical

sciences think to be essential for confirmation. Tillich is right in affirming there can be no "science of values" in this narrow meaning of the term. If it is broadened to cover all areas of human experience, it is possible to study them more meaningfully.

A comprehensive theory of value will need to consider the possibility of experiences beyond the spatio-temporal sensations, from which reason abstracts its categories, such as space, time, causality, and substance. Man has learned through sensation and reason that in spatial terms the second dimension -- breadth or spherical surface -- transcends the first dimension -- length or spherical circumference -- without destroying it. Likewise, the third dimension--depth or spherical volume -- does not destroy length and breadth. It rather encompasses them and fulfills their meaning. There is some indication that our understanding of spatial motion--time--is doing the same for the first three dimensions. Time seems to express itself through velocity, direction, and duration, making it meaningful to discuss position, extension, and volume.

If man is discovering that values cannot be fully understood in terms of space and time, then it is not unreasonable to look for evidence of another dimension of reality, which would not destroy these, but give them meaning and significance. Tillich's use of the "eternal" may point in this direction. Mathematics has demonstrated that multi-dimensionality is logical. Whether the structure of being-itself, ontology, can convincingly demonstrate infinity within and through the conditions of finitude may well be the present task of value theory to discover.

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